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States amass troves of information detailing the regulated activities of their
citizens, including activities that violate federal law. Not surprisingly, the federal
government is keenly interested in this information. It has ordered reluctant state
officials to turn over their confidential files concerning medical marijuana, juvenile
criminal history, immigration status, tax payments, and employment discrimination, among many other matters, to help enforce federal laws against private
citizens. Many states have objected to these demands, citing opposition to federal
policies and concerns about the costs of breaching confidences, but lower courts have
uniformly upheld the federal government’s power to commandeer information from
the states. This Article provides the first in-depth analysis of the commandeering of
states’ secrets. It identifies the distinct ways in which the federal government
demands information from the states, illuminates the harms such demands cause,
and challenges the prevailing wisdom that states may not keep secrets from the
federal government. Perhaps most importantly, the Article argues that courts should
consider federal demands for information to be prohibited commandeering. It
suggests that the commandeering of state information-gathering services is indistinguishable in all relevant respects from the commandeering of other state executive
services. The Article discusses the implications such a ruling would have in our
federal system, including its potential to bolster the states’ roles as sources of
autonomous political power and vehicles of passive resistance to federal authority.
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INTRODUCTION
In the debates over WikiLeaks and similar campaigns to expose government secrets, the federal government has consistently championed the
need for government secrecy.1 For example, it has claimed that the leak of
its confidential files has disrupted the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, put the
lives of American soldiers at risk, and strained key diplomatic relations.2
But in another largely overlooked context, the federal government has
actually championed the need for exposing government secrets, at least
when the secrets in question are being kept by another sovereign. Across a
growing set of policy domains, the federal government has been quietly
ordering state governments to hand over their own confidential records to
help enforce federal laws against private citizens. For example, federal
agencies have demanded access to state medical marijuana registries to aid
in the prosecution of suspected marijuana traffickers, city police files to
facilitate the deportation of nonresident aliens, state tax rolls to investigate
cases of federal tax fraud, and transcripts of state administrative hearings to
pursue employment discrimination claims against private employers.3
This Article provides the first in-depth analysis of federal demands for
confidential state records, demands that I call the commandeering of states’
secrets. It traces the genesis of these demands to the federal government’s
information deficit vis-à-vis the states. Using a combination of government
agents, the latest surveillance technology, and reports submitted by private
citizens, state governments now gather massive quantities of information
detailing the activities they regulate.4 To name just a few, state repositories
of information now include: medical marijuana registries, crime reports,
professional disciplinary records, prescription records, business licenses,
criminal history records, property title records, and vehicle registrations.5
The states gather this information to enforce their own laws, but such data
may also be used to enforce federal law. Indeed, state agencies sometimes

1 For a detailed account of the Wikileaks controversy, see generally DAVID LEIGH & LUKE
HARDING WITH ED PILKINGTON ET AL., WIKILEAKS: INSIDE JULIAN ASSANGE’S WAR ON
SECRECY (2011), and N.Y. TIMES, OPEN SECRETS: WIKILEAKS, WAR, AND AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY (Alexander Star ed., 2011). For a sampling of legal commentary on the organization
and its mission, see generally Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle
Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 (2011) and Mark
Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 1, at 331-33.
3 See infra Section I.C.
4 See infra Section I.A.
5 See infra Section I.A.
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have far better information about compliance with federal regulations than
do their federal counterparts. For example, many states have compiled
extensive patient registries to help them enforce their medical marijuana
laws. These registries contain a unique trove of information that federal
agents have recently used to track down and prosecute the people who grow
and distribute marijuana pursuant to state law.6
It should come as no surprise that the states do not always want to share
their data with the federal government. For one thing, doing so increases
the cost to the states of gathering the information in the first instance.7
Citizens already have an incentive to evade state regulations and avoid
detection by state regulators. This makes the task of gathering information
about regulated activity enormously expensive. Commandeering states’
secrets adds to that expense by giving citizens an additional incentive to
conceal their activity from state regulators: doing so may dramatically
reduce the chances that federal regulators will catch them. All governments
rely extensively on their citizens for information. To replace or restore this
vital source of information, the states would need to hire more agents,
employ more technology, or make deeper concessions to encourage private
reporting.
The commandeering of states’ secrets also has political costs.8 In many
cases, it forces state officials to help advance federal policies they or their
constituents deem objectionable. In addition, when the federal government
orders a state official to provide information about violations of an unpopular federal law, there is also a real danger that citizens will denounce the
state official for being complicit in federal law enforcement. They will label
him a “snitch” and not merely a “stooge.” For example, when a citizen is
discovered and prosecuted by the federal government using information she
submitted to her state in the course of applying for her medical marijuana
distribution license, she may blame the state official who disclosed the information (especially if that official had earlier vouchsafed her confidentiality).
Despite these costs and protests by the states, legal scholars have largely
ignored federal commandeering of states’ secrets.9 More troubling than the
academic neglect, however, is the fact that lower courts have almost
invariably upheld the practice, brushing aside any comparison to constitutionally prohibited commandeering on two grounds.10

6 See infra text accompanying note 67.
7 See infra Section II.A.
8 See infra Section II.B.
9 See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 162-65, 169-71 and accompanying text.
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First, some lower courts have simply presumed that providing information about violations of federal law does not amount to assisting in the
administration or enforcement of federal law. These courts have made a
categorical distinction between demands for information about federally
regulated activity and demands for other types of administrative services.
The latter are subject to the anti-commandeering rule, but the former,
somehow, are not.
Second, some courts have suggested that demands for information simply
do not raise the same constitutional concerns that animated the Court’s
rulings in New York v. United States11 and Printz v. United States.12 In those
cases, the Court emphasized the economic and political costs commandeering imposes on the states—namely, the burden they bear in administering
federal programs and the political responsibility they shoulder if those
programs prove unpopular with constituents.13 In essence, the lower courts
have concluded that forcing states to share information either imposes no
burden (since the states already have the information on hand), or imposes
a trivial burden that is minimal as compared to the federal government’s
interest in the information.14 As a result of these rulings, federal authorities
may now seize and use to enforce federal law almost any information
gathered by state governments.
This Article challenges the prevailing assessment of the constitutionality
and resulting harms of secrets commandeering. Perhaps most importantly,
it suggests that the commandeering of states’ secrets should be deemed
constitutionally prohibited. It argues that the distinction between demands
for information and demands for other types of enforcement services has no
obvious basis.15 As a descriptive matter, this distinction fails to account for
the bulk of what law enforcement agents actually do—gather and report
information about regulated activity. As a matter of precedent, it contradicts the very holding of the Printz decision, which invalidated provisions of

11 See 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (“[W]hile Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within
their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the
States to do so.”).
12 See 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (reaffirming the holding in New York).
13 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. R EV. 1, 16
(2004) (suggesting that the anti-commandeering rule requires Congress “to internalize the
financial and political costs of its actions by prohibiting it from making state institutions enforce
federal law”). For a discussion of the structural rationale behind the anti-commandeering rule, see
infra Section III.B.
14 See infra notes 169-75, 178-87 and accompanying text.
15 See infra Sections IV.A-B.
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the Brady Act requiring state officials to do no more than search state
databases.16 As a matter of history, it ignores the fact that most methods
now employed to commandeer states’ secrets were unknown to the Framers
and emerged only in the last several decades. Most fundamentally, the
distinction allows the federal government to transform state law enforcement officials into the unwitting tools of federal law enforcement—the very
harm the anti-commandeering rule is designed to prevent.
The argument that states should be allowed to keep secrets from the
federal government has broader implications for state power in our federal
system. Among other things, the argument comes closer to realizing the full
potential of Printz—namely, the notion that the states may engage in
passive resistance to federal authority by refusing to lend their assistance to
federal law enforcement.17 Because enforcement arguably “controls the
effective meaning of the law,”18 and because the federal government’s own
enforcement capacity is quite limited, the states’ ability to control their own
executive resources gives them, or should give them, de facto control over a
number of important policy domains that are formally subject to congressional regulation.19 States have already begun to recognize and pursue this
power, slowly pushing back against arguably oppressive federal laws and
testing new solutions to common problems.20 Unfortunately, however, the
lower courts have undermined the states’ ability to resist federal authority
by allowing federal agencies to conscript their substantial informationgathering capacity.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how states successfully
gather information about regulated activity and why the federal government
sometimes has an interest in that information to enforce its own laws. It
also details the three methods the federal government uses to compel states
to provide information. Part II identifies and elaborates upon the economic

16 See Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP.
CT. REV. 199, 234 (arguing that “[i]t is [u]nclear . . . on what basis reporting requirements can
meaningfully be distinguished from ‘actual administration of a federal program’” (citing Printz,
505 U.S. at 918)).
17 See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1445-50, 1460-62 (2009)
[hereinafter Mikos, Limits of Supremacy] (attributing states’ increasingly successful opposition to
federal laws, in part, to the Court’s anti-commandeering rule).
18 Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 698, 700 (2011).
19 See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1463-79 (arguing that states’ de facto
authority exceeds their de jure authority in many policy domains).
20 Most notably, several states have legalized limited uses for marijuana, which the federal
government unflinchingly proscribes. Id. at 1427-32.
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and political harms caused by the commandeering of states’ secrets. Part III
reviews the legal challenges the states have waged against such commandeering and why the courts have rejected those challenges. Part IV reexamines the conventional wisdom that the anti-commandeering rule allows
the commandeering of states’ secrets. It argues that the distinction between
demands for information and demands for other types of enforcement
services is unsupportable and suggests instead that courts treat federal
demands for information as prohibited commandeering. Such a ruling is
needed to preserve the states’ role as autonomous sources of power in our
federal system.
I. MONITORING REGULATED ACTIVITY
Gathering information about regulated activity is essential to good governance. Regulators need information to draft prudent regulations, to study
their effects, and—most importantly, for present purposes—to observe and
enforce compliance.21 This Part details the strategies that states employ to
gather the information they need to enforce their laws effectively. It also
highlights the information advantage states sometimes enjoy vis-à-vis the
federal government—namely, that states sometimes have more information
about regulated activity than does the federal government. This phenomenon explains why the federal government is so interested in obtaining
information from the states. In addition, this Part details the three methods
by which the federal government can compel information from the states
when the states demur.
A. State Monitoring of Regulated Activity
To enforce their civil and criminal regulations, states must gather detailed information about the activities they regulate.22 To gather the

21 See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE L.J. 1111,
1114-17 (1947) (“The power of investigation is part and parcel of the prosecuting power and of the
practically more important power of supervision which grows out of the prosecuting power.”).
22 See, e.g., Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging Streams
of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 584 (1994) (claiming the
government would be unable “to enforce its regulatory or fiscal policies . . . without wide
powers to gather information”); Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and
Other Federal Crimes, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 223, 235 [hereinafter Mikos, State Taxation] (“The
state’s ability to deter tax evasion rests, in large part, on its powers of observation—namely, its
ability to detect evasion.”); id. at 236 (“[T]he tax compliance literature has demonstrated just how
important observing taxable activity is to curbing tax evasion. In general, tax gaps shrink the more
information government receives concerning taxable activity.” (citation omitted)).
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information they need, states employ two basic approaches. One approach
uses government agents—assisted by technology—to monitor and observe
regulated activity.23 I call this the gumshoe detective approach to information
gathering. The traditional approach to drug law enforcement is a paradigmatic example of this technique. Law enforcement agents conduct drug
sweeps at schools, they use thermal imaging devices to spot marijuana grow
houses, they wiretap the phones of suspected drug dealers, and they
infiltrate drug cartels to set up undercover sting operations. Other agents
then use the information gathered through such measures to charge,
prosecute, and ultimately sanction drug offenders.
The second approach to information gathering uses private citizens to
monitor and report on regulated activity, thereby supplementing surveillance by gumshoe detectives. In some situations, private citizens provide
information about their own activities. For example, most of the states that
permit residents to use marijuana for medical purposes require them to
register with a state health agency first. Residents must provide the agency
with detailed medical records that establish their eligibility for inclusion in
the medical marijuana program.24 In other situations, private citizens
provide information about the activities of third parties. Every state, for
example, requires at least some professionals, including teachers and
physicians, to alert law enforcement when they suspect that a child has been
abused.25 All told, there are thousands of state and local statutes imposing
reporting requirements on private citizens and firms. Through such reports,
state and local governments maintain copious records detailing a broad
spectrum of activities, such as the purchase of prescription drugs, the

23 Electronic surveillance certainly enhances the effectiveness of traditional gumshoe detective work. Governments glean enormous quantities of data from CCTV, credit card reports, and
so on. In theory, government agents can mine this data cheaply to detect and sanction legal
violations. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 317, 322-24 (2008) (categorizing and evaluating the utility of government data
mining). In reality, however, data mining is still a very poor way of identifying the perpetrators of
past and future violations. The error rate for such projections can be staggeringly high, in some
contexts generating 200 false leads for every violator correctly identified. See AMY BELASCO,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31786, TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAMS:
FUNDING, COMPOSITION, AND OVERSIGHT ISSUES 16 (2003), available at http://usacm.
acm.org/images/documents/crista_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
24 See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1428-30 (discussing medical marijuana
registration systems).
25 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF H EALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF STATE
LAWS 1 (2010), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/
manda.pdf.
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transfer of real property, the sale of alcohol and tobacco, the payment of
sales taxes, the carrying of concealed firearms, and the use of medical
marijuana, to name just a few.
Both approaches to gathering information entail substantial costs. The
states spend more than $78 billion annually on police services alone,26
employing more than 900,000 agents to monitor regulated activity, to
investigate suspected violations of the law, and to apprehend criminals.27
Likewise, states give their residents concessions to provide information—a
necessary step when the information helps the government enforce regulations against those same residents.28 Sometimes states offer monetary
payments for information. Consider the cash rewards police departments
offer in return for tips about ongoing criminal investigations. Even more
commonly, the states grant legal concessions to people who provide honest
information about their own (or someone else’s) activities. For example,
some states with medical marijuana laws grant immunity from criminal
prosecution (among other perks) only to those residents who have successfully registered to use marijuana.29 And states commonly give convicted
criminals a break at sentencing for providing incriminating evidence against
their coconspirators.30 In the alternative, the states occasionally threaten to
sanction citizens who fail to provide information about unlawful behavior.
Many states, for example, threaten to fine professionals who neglect to
report suspected instances of child abuse.31

26 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS O NLINE tbl.1.6.2006, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t162006.pdf.
27 Id. tbl.1.26.2006, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t1262006.pdf. Most

of the functions categorized under “police protection” involve information gathering tasks of some
sort, but police protection also includes some other enforcement tasks as well. For a detailed
description of the term see id. app. 1 at 4, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/app1.pdf.
28 Most regulations impose costs, thereby giving people an incentive to conceal their activity
from government. For example, a regulation might require people to abstain from some activity
they find pleasurable (e.g., a ban on using marijuana) or to pay a fee for the privilege of engaging
in that activity (e.g., a tax on the purchase of cigarettes). If citizens can evade detection by
government regulators, they can avoid incurring these costs.
29 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.090(a) (2008) (granting an affirmative defense against
criminal prosecution to those individuals who register medical use of marijuana with the state).
30 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 893.135(4) (2011) (“The state attorney may move the sentencing
court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person who is convicted of a violation of this
section and who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of
any . . . person engaged in trafficking in controlled substances.”).
31 See Brad Heath, Silent Abuses, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2011, at 2A (identifying categories of
professionals in each state required to report instances of child abuse). In reality, however, child
abuse reporting requirements are seldom enforced. See id. (“Even when authorities bring criminal
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Through a combination of these approaches, the states have collected
massive amounts of data on the activities they regulate. Oregon, for
example, has coaxed more than 54,000 of its residents to provide state
regulators with detailed documentation regarding their eligibility—and
arguably their intention—to use marijuana for medical purposes.32 In
countless other detailed files, the states have compiled information they
need to detect, prosecute, punish, and ultimately deter many (though not
all) violations of state regulations.
B. Using State Monitoring to Enforce Federal Law
So far, I have focused on how the states gather information about the
activities they regulate. But of course, the federal government commonly
employs the same basic strategies to gather information about the activities
it regulates. It has its own extensive network of law enforcement agents—
approximately 120,000 strong.33 Like the states, the federal government also
requires private citizens to monitor and report on some of the activities it
regulates. Most notably, the IRS requires employers to report the wages of
their employees. These reports give the IRS the data it needs to enforce
income taxes against individual employees.34 Federal agencies also require
firms to report on a host of other activities ranging from large cash transactions to suspicious web downloads.35
The federal government, however, has another option at its disposal: it
can obtain some of the information it needs from the states. In many
instances, the same information the states gather to enforce their own laws
could be used to enforce federal law as well. This is hardly surprising, since

charges for not reporting abuse, court records show most of the cases are thrown out; those that
aren’t, seldom lead to jail time or significant fines.”).
32 OR. HEALTH AUTH., OREGON MEDICAL MARIJUANA PROGRAM STATISTICS,
http://public.health.oregon.gov/DiseasesConditions/ChronicDisease/MedicalMarijuanaProgram/
Pages/data.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (reporting enrollment statistics for state medical
marijuana registry).
33 See BRIAN REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN: FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008, at 1 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf
(compiling data on federal law enforcement officers drawn in part from the 2008 Census of
Federal Law Enforcement Officers).
34 See Mikos, State Taxation, supra note 22, at 235-37 (discussing the federal tax reporting
requirements of third-party employers vis-à-vis their employees).
35 See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring licensed firearms dealers to report,
inter alia, all sales of firearms); id. § 2258 (requiring internet service providers to report known
violations of federal child pornography laws); 21 U.S.C. § 5313 (requiring financial institutions to
report transactions involving a threshold amount of currency).
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Congress and the states share concurrent jurisdiction over a broad array of
issues. Indeed, in many instances, state agencies can obtain better information on jointly regulated activities than can their federal counterparts.
State agencies have this informational advantage for two primary reasons. First, the states employ a much larger network of law enforcement
agents than that employed by the federal government. Indeed, state law
enforcement agents currently outnumber their federal counterparts nearly
nine-to-one.36 This larger network generates correspondingly larger
volumes of data. Second, in many domains, the states give their residents
stronger incentives to provide information about their activities.37 For
example, most medical marijuana states give their residents a powerful
incentive to register to use the drug: doing so immunizes them from
criminal prosecution under state law. These residents conversely have a
strong incentive to hide their marijuana use from federal authorities because
admitting their use to federal agents would expose them to harsh federal
sanctions.
Given this information asymmetry, it is not surprising that federal
agencies demand access to the information possessed by their state counterparts. To illustrate the allure of states’ secrets for federal law enforcement
agencies, imagine how the information contained in a state medical marijuana
registry could bolster ongoing efforts to enforce the federal ban against
medical marijuana. The federal ban on marijuana is likely having only a
minimal impact on the market for medical marijuana at the moment. As I
have explained elsewhere,
Though the [Controlled Substances Act] certainly threatens harsh sanctions
[for possession and distribution of marijuana], the federal government does
not have the resources to impose them frequently enough to make a meaningful impact on proscribed behavior . . . .
Given limited resources and a huge number of targets, the current expected [federal] sanction for medical marijuana users is quite low.38

By exploiting information already gathered by the states, however, federal agents could give the federal ban more bite.39 Federal agents could use

36
37

See supra notes 27 & 33.
The federal government has adopted a number of zero-tolerance policies that discourage
private citizens from providing sensitive information, leaving big gaps in its information about the
activities it regulates. For an illuminating discussion of federal hostility toward needle exchange
programs and other harm-reduction policies, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS:
WORKSHOP ON NEEDLE EXCHANGE AND BLEACH DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS 113-26 (1994).
38 Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1464-65.
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state medical marijuana registries to track down the people who are now
using, recommending, and supplying marijuana pursuant to state law at
little or no cost to the federal treasury. The federal government would then
need to prosecute only a handful of medical marijuana users (or more likely,
their suppliers) to greatly increase the expected sanction for flouting the
federal marijuana ban. In fact, the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) has already exploited one state medical marijuana registry to bring
criminal prosecutions against marijuana distributors.40
It is important to recognize that the federal government need not resort
to such tactics. By using the same means currently employed by the states,
the federal government could gather essentially the same information.
Congress could boost funding for various federal law enforcement agencies
to enhance their capacity to monitor regulated activity directly. It could also
amend federal law to give private citizens stronger incentives to supply
information to federal agencies. Or, at the very least, it could offer to buy
the information it needs from the states.41
The problem with any of these strategies is that they entail costs, and
Congress currently has little incentive to incur such costs when it can
instead “free ride” off of state information-gathering efforts. As it stands,
the federal government can commandeer virtually any piece of information
the states possess.42 The federal government does not need to invest in its
own information-gathering apparatus when it can piggyback off of the
labors of state gumshoe detectives. It does not need to compromise its own
stern, zero-tolerance policies to encourage citizens to supply information
when it can seize the information they have already supplied to the states.
And it does not need to compensate the states for their troubles. The option
of seizing information in this way clearly saves the federal government the
considerable financial and political costs normally associated with monitoring
regulated activity. But as I show below, those costs are never really saved;
they are merely shifted onto the states.43

39 That is, at least until users figure out that the federal government can exploit the information
they now provide to state authorities and stop providing that information. The potential to
undermine state data collection is a hidden cost of commandeering states’ secrets. See infra Part II.A.
40 See infra text accompanying note 67.
41 See infra subsection IV.C.1.a.
42 See infra Part III.
43 See infra Part II.
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C. The Commandeering of States’ Secrets
This Section identifies and details for the first time the three distinct
means by which the federal government demands information from the
states: (1) statutory reporting requirements, (2) administrative subpoenas,
and (3) grand jury subpoenas. I call these three methods collectively the
commandeering of states’ secrets. The commandeering of states’ secrets occurs
any time the federal government compels a state to report or disclose any
information the state possesses but does not want to (and has not already
agreed to) share. I distinguish this form of commandeering from situations
in which the federal government merely asks for information from a state,
but gives the state the option to decline the request. For the most part, my
analyses and criticisms of commandeering apply to all three methods of
secrets commandeering employed by the federal government. There are,
however, some differences among the methods that may justify treating
them separately for constitutional purposes.44
1. Statutory Reporting Requirements
In the first and most commonly discussed method of commandeering,
Congress orders state officials to report information to a designated federal
agency.45 The requirements imposed by Congress so far have concerned a
variety of regulatory areas. For example, Congress has ordered state medical
boards to report all denials of staff privileges to a national databank.46 It has
ordered state law enforcement agencies to report cases of missing children
to the DOJ’s National Crime Information Center.47 Congress has ordered
state transportation authorities to provide traffic safety data to the Secretary
of Transportation.48 It has compelled state public safety agencies to inform
the FEMA Administrator whether local hotels are in compliance with
federal fire safety guidelines.49 And it has ordered state governors to report
the presence of asbestos in public and private K-12 schools to the EPA

44
45

See infra Section IV.C.
On occasion, Congress also requires states to gather information they do not already
possess, potentially exacerbating the costs of commandeering. I focus on the statutory duty to
report information to emphasize how that seemingly mundane duty poses serious problems for
states.
46 42 U.S.C. § 11133(b) (2006) (part of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986).
47 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) (Crime Control Act of 1990).
48 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Highway Safety Act of 1991) (as amended by Pub. L. 112-141, 126
Stat. 405 (2012)).
49 15 U.S.C. § 2224(a)(1) (Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990).
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Administrator.50 As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Printz,
information reporting requirements such as these are a recent feature of
federal-state relations.51 Indeed, the oldest reporting requirement I could
find is no more than three decades old.
The reporting requirements imposed on the states help the federal government to enforce other federal laws. Consider the duties imposed under
the Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990.52 The Act’s express purpose
was to “save lives and protect property by promoting fire and life safety in
hotels, motels, and all places of public accommodation affecting commerce.”53 To that end, the Act requires such places to install fire alarms and
sprinkler systems.54 The sanction for failure to comply is debarment from
hosting federally funded meetings, conventions, conferences, and similar
functions.55 To help enforce that debarment sanction, the Act compels states
to “submit to the [Administrator of FEMA] a list of those places of public
accommodation affecting commerce located in the State which . . . meet
the requirements” of the Act.56 In other words, the Act requires states to
identify for a federal agency every venue that complies with the federal law.
Importantly, the duties imposed by the federal reporting statutes are
compulsory. The Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act, for example, does not
even contemplate that a state might refuse to provide information. I
distinguish these statutory reporting requirements from congressional
statutes that merely encourage states to report information, but refrain from
compelling them to do so. As I discuss below, such voluntary reporting
arrangements do not raise the same objections as do compulsory demands
for state records.57
2. Administrative Subpoenas
In a second method of commandeering, Congress delegates authority to
federal agencies to demand information from private parties and, implicitly,

50
51

20 U.S.C. § 4013 (Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984).
See 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (declining to address the validity of several federal statutes of
“recent vintage” that require the participation of state or local officials in the implementation of
federal regulatory schemes).
52 Pub. L. No. 101-391, 104 Stat. 747 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15
U.S.C.).
53 Id. § 2(b).
54 Id. § 3(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2225(a)).
55 Id. § 6(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2225a(a)).
56 Id. § 3(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2224(a)(1)).
57 See infra subsection IV.C.1 (identifying permissible methods of federal solicitation of state
data).
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state governments, for use in civil or even criminal enforcement actions.
These demands are called “administrative subpoenas.” To date, Congress
has passed more than 300 administrative subpoena statutes “grant[ing] some
form of administrative subpoena authority to most federal agencies.”58 For
example, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) authorizes the Attorney
General to “subpena [sic] witnesses, compel the attendance and testimony
of witnesses, and require the production of any records . . . which the
Attorney General finds relevant or material” to a federal drug investigation.59 Pursuant to such statutory authority, agencies generally do not need
prior court approval to issue administrative subpoenas.60 What is more,
agencies enjoy virtually unfettered discretion in crafting the subpoenas, as
long as the “evidence sought . . . [is] not plainly incompetent or irrelevant
to any lawful purpose.”61
Although administrative subpoena statutes generally do not explicitly
authorize their use against the states, federal agencies have increasingly
exercised this subpoena power to demand confidential information from
state governments. This demand occurs in two types of situations. Most
commonly, federal agencies have subpoenaed confidential records from a
state or local government entity that is the target of an agency’s investigation. For example, Title VII expressly grants the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) access to “any evidence of any person
being investigated . . . that relates to unlawful employment practices
. . . and is relevant to the charge under investigation.”62 Pursuant to that
authority, the EEOC has subpoenaed employment records from a county
public utility commission,63 a city police department,64 and a state highway
58 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO C ONGRESS ON THE
USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES
AND ENTITIES 6 (undated), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm
[hereinafter DOJ REPORT].
59 21 U.S.C. § 876(a).
60 See DOJ REPORT, supra note 58, at 7 (“While an agency’s exercise of administrative
subpoena authority is not subject to prior judicial approval, a subpoena issuance is subject to
judicial review . . . .”). Even when prior court approval is needed, there are few grounds for
challenging the request. See United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 976 (6th Cir. 1995)
(emphasizing that a “district court’s role in the enforcement of an administrative subpoena is a
limited one”).
61 Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943) (enforcing a subpoena issued
by the Secretary of Labor for payroll records of a company paying workers below the minimum
wage set by the Secretary).
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a).
63 See EEOC v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 631 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2011)
(upholding, in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case, the subpoena of employment
records of a public utility).
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authority,65 among many others,66 for use in probing employment discrimination claims against these same government agencies.
More troublingly, federal agencies have subpoenaed confidential state
records to investigate potential federal offenses committed by private
citizens. In one recent case, for example, the DEA invoked the Attorney
General’s authority under the CSA to subpoena the Michigan Department
of Community Health for portions of its medical marijuana registry.67 The
registry contained medical histories and other information concerning seven
individuals being investigated by the DEA for marijuana offenses under
federal law.68 In another case, the EEOC demanded the confidential
transcripts of a state unemployment compensation hearing for purposes of
investigating employment discrimination claims against a private employer.69
In these and other cases, the courts have upheld the subpoenas against
objections from state authorities.70

64 See EEOC v. Norfolk Police Dep’t, 45 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1995) (enforcing, in a race
discrimination case, the subpoena of the police department’s policy on the reinstatement of an
officer suspended for criminal violations).
65 See EEOC v. Ill. State Tollway Auth., 800 F.2d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding, in a
religious discrimination case, the subpoenas of a state agency for documents and interviews with
agency employees).
66 See, e.g., EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 603, 613-14 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding, in an age
discrimination case, administrative subpoenas for the Cook County Department of Corrections’
retirement policy as well as the testimony of a knowledgeable officer); Nueces Cnty. Hosp. Dist.
v. EEOC, 518 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding, in a discrimination case, the EEOC’s
authority to subpoena the personnel director of the Nueces County Hospital District to appear
and provide various documents to the Commission); EEOC v. Univ. of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296,
1298-99, 1306 (10th Cir. 1974) (upholding, in a national origin discrimination case, the subpoena of
university personnel files for recently terminated and current faculty members).
67 See United States v. Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, No. 10-109, 2011 WL 2412602, at *1-2,
*11 (W.D. Mich. June 9, 2011) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 876 (a) and (c) as the source of the Attorney
General’s authority to issue and enforce subpoenas).
68 Id. at *1 (reporting that the subpoena sought “copies of any and all documents, records,
applications, payment method of any application for Medical Marijuana Patient Cards and
Medical Marijuana Caregiver cards and copies of front and back of any cards” for seven named
individuals (citation omitted)).
69 See EEOC v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 995 F.2d 106, 107, 109 (7th Cir. 1993) (determining
that the EEOC’s subpoena of unemployment compensation hearings was valid despite a
conflicting state statute making such records confidential); see also Sexton v. Poole Truck Lines,
Inc., 888 F. Supp. 127, 131 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (refusing to quash plaintiff’s discovery request for
confidential licensing records maintained by the Alabama Department of Public Safety, which the
plaintiff planned to use in an Americans with Disabilities Act claim against his private employer).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Colo. Bd. of Pharmacy, No. 10-01116, 2010 WL 3547898, *1, *4
(D. Colo. Aug. 13, 2010) (upholding DEA subpoenas of confidential state pharmacy records in a
federal investigation of possible drug offenses by three physicians).
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3. Grand Jury Subpoenas
In the third method of commandeering, federal grand juries subpoena
documents and testimony for use in federal criminal investigations.71 The
federal grand jury has substantial investigatory authority, and the Supreme
Court has repeatedly approved the zealous exercise of that authority in
criminal cases. In United States v. Morton Salt Co., for example, the Court
asserted that the grand jury “can investigate merely on suspicion that the
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is
not.”72 Then, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court emphasized that “[a] grand
jury investigation ‘is not fully carried out until every available clue has been
run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime
has been committed.’”73 Even though the grand jury is a quasi-judicial body,
it is the United States Attorney who wields the grand jury’s broad investigative powers as a practical matter.74 For example, the United States
Attorney may issue subpoenas on behalf of the grand jury, without its prior
approval or knowledge.75
Over the past few decades, federal prosecutors have aggressively employed the grand jury subpoena power to demand confidential records from
state agencies for use in investigating federal crimes committed by state
agents and private citizens alike. To give just a few examples, federal grand
juries have issued subpoenas for individual and business tax returns
submitted to state revenue agencies;76 contingency fee agreements filed in

71
72
73

See infra subsection IV.C.2.a.
338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (quoting United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970));
see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (stating that a grand jury “may compel
the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its
operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the
conduct of criminal trials”); United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 298-99 (1991)
(explaining that subjecting grand jury proceedings to various procedural rules would delay and
potentially undermine the secrecy of the proceedings).
74 See W AYNE R. L A F AVE ET AL ., C RIMINAL P ROCEDURE § 8.2(c) (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing the prosecutor’s role in conducting and controlling grand jury investigations).
75 See 1 SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, F EDERAL GRAND J URY: A GUIDE TO
LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.2 (2d ed. 2006) (“Prosecutors do not have to obtain a grand jury’s
approval before issuing subpoenas; indeed, a grand jury may not even be aware that a prosecutor is
issuing subpoenas on its behalf.”).
76 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena for N.Y. State Income Tax Records, 468 F. Supp. 575, 57678 (N.D.N.Y.) (refusing to quash a grand jury subpoena for income tax records on file at the New
York State Department of Taxation because the objective of confidentiality provisions in the tax
law is “more than counterbalanced by the necessity of thorough grand jury investigations”), appeal
dismissed, 607 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1979); In re N.Y. State Sales Tax Records, 382 F. Supp. 1205, 1206
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state court;77 disciplinary records maintained by a state bar association;78
patient complaints submitted to a state medical ethics board;79 unemployment compensation records submitted by private employers to a state
industrial relations board;80 and communications between a state social
worker and her charges81—all for investigations of criminal misconduct by
private citizens. In each case, the courts enforced the subpoenas despite
vigorous objections raised by the state agencies.
*

*

*

In sum, by employing large numbers of government agents and by
granting regulatory concessions to induce private reporting, the states have
been remarkably successful at gathering data about regulated activity. Their
success has not gone unnoticed by federal law enforcement agencies, which,
across a number of domains, have less information about compliance with
federal law than do their state counterparts. Though the states do not
always want to share their information, the federal government has three
legal tools at its disposal to compel them to do so: congressionally imposed
mandatory reporting requirements, administrative subpoenas, and grand
jury subpoenas. It thus appears the states cannot keep secrets from the
federal government.

(W.D.N.Y. 1974) (“The powers of the federal grand jury . . . must prevail over the nondisclosure provision of . . . the New York State Tax Law.”).
77 See In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[A]ny
presumed privilege created by [the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas] Rule 202 must yield here
to the public’s interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings.”).
78 See United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1398 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding the validity of
a subpoena because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) and Federal Rule of Evidence 501
prevail over “state law privileges in criminal cases,” including privileges under the Florida Bar
rules).
79 See In re Grand Jury Matter, 762 F. Supp. 333, 335 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (recognizing that the
Supremacy Clause requires federal grand jury investigatory powers to prevail over conflicting
state confidentiality provisions).
80 See United States v. Blasi, 462 F. Supp. 373, 374 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (refusing to quash a
subpoena as requested by the Alabama Director of Industrial Relations in spite of state legal
prohibitions against such disclosure).
81 See In re Prod. of Records to the Grand Jury, 618 F. Supp. 440, 441, 444 (D. Mass. 1985)
(holding that, if a grand jury could show by affidavit the necessity of obtaining patients’
communications to social workers, then the federal government’s need for the information could
override privileges of nondisclosure afforded to the Massachusetts Department of Social Services).
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II. COMMANDEERING’S HARMS
In this Part, I identify and discuss the two primary harms caused by the
commandeering of states’ secrets—harms that have been overlooked or
misjudged by courts and legal scholars. First, commandeering states’ secrets
has economic costs, which drain state resources. The direct costs of complying with a federal subpoena or reporting requirement are usually trivial, but
the dynamic costs are not. By increasing the incentives of citizens to conceal
activity from state regulators, the threat of commandeering makes it more
difficult for states to gather information in the first instance. Second,
commandeering states’ secrets has political costs. One such cost is that
commandeering forces state officials to advance federal policies that they or
their constituents may deem objectionable. A second political cost is that
commandeering blurs the lines of political accountability. State officials
might be unfairly blamed for providing information to federal officials and
advancing controversial federal policies. Importantly, these economic and
political costs correspond to the costs animating the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering decisions. They also form the normative basis for a viable
constitutional federalism challenge to the commandeering of states’ secrets
under the anti-commandeering rule.82
A. The Economic Costs
To begin, commandeering states’ secrets can make it far more difficult
for states to gather data about regulated activity. Commandeering states’
secrets increases citizens’ incentives to conceal their activity from state
monitors, because it links the work of those monitors to the enforcement of
federal law and the imposition of federal sanctions. As a result, states must
spend more to get the same information they would have obtained without
commandeering.83
As explained earlier,84 individuals engaging in regulated activity have an
incentive to conceal that activity from the government to evade the costs of

82
83

See infra Part IV.
See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1411,
1422-24 (2005) [hereinafter Mikos, Enforcing State Law] (explaining how imposing federal
sanctions on persons convicted of state crimes may cause defendants in state cases to resist charges
more aggressively, at substantial cost to state prosecutors); see also Mikos, State Taxation, supra
note 22, at 258-59 (suggesting that the threat their tax databases could be commandeered would
undermine state efforts to monitor and collect proposed state excise taxes on the distribution of
marijuana).
84 See supra note 28.
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regulation. Commandeering introduces new costs into a citizen’s decision
calculus. A citizen who is deciding whether to divulge information requested
or demanded by a state official now must consider how that information will
be used by both state and federal authorities. In particular, she must
consider the increase in the expected federal sanction that stems from giving
the federal government access to the information. If the increase is large
enough, the citizen may withhold information from the state,85 thereby
forcing the state to obtain the information using other, more costly means.
To see how even small changes (real or perceived) in expected federal
sanctions can discourage citizens from cooperating with state officials,
consider an example involving a proposed state marijuana tax.86 In particular, suppose that a state legalizes the distribution of marijuana, but imposes
a 10% tax on such sales—a level roughly equivalent to what it considers the
harms attributable to marijuana. To help enforce the tax, the state requires
all marijuana distributors to obtain a license and to record and report all
sales to the state’s revenue collection agency. To give this reporting
requirement some teeth, the state threatens to impose a fine equivalent to
200% of unreported sales, and it employs gumshoe detectives to identify
reporting violations. Suppose these detectives uncover 10% of all unreported
sales. In this hypothetical, a risk-neutral marijuana distributor would have
an incentive to fully report her taxable sales to the state. Doing so exposes
her to a certain 10% tax on reported sales, but that is less than the expected
fine of 20% (200% x 10%) on unreported sales.
Notwithstanding state law, of course, the distribution of marijuana remains a federal crime. Suppose, for ease of illustration, that the federal
government threatens to impose sanctions on marijuana distribution
equivalent to 100% of the value of marijuana sold. Suppose as well that the
federal government can detect only 5% of all marijuana sales using its own
agents. This likely would not be enough to deter marijuana distribution; it
effectively amounts to a 5% tax on the drug. But suppose the United States
Attorney threatens to commandeer the state’s tax records to bolster
enforcement of the federal ban. With those records, the federal government

85

See, e.g., John Richardson, New Privacy Rules for Medicinal Pot Face U.S. Scrutiny, PORTPRESS HERALD (Me.) (May 14, 2011), http://www.pressherald.com/news/new-privacyrules-for-medicinal-pot-face-u_s_-scrutiny_2011-05-14.html (reporting concerns that many patients
have not signed up for Maine’s medical marijuana registry because of the fear it could be exploited
by the federal government).
86 For an in-depth discussion of recent proposals to legalize and tax marijuana at the state
level, and the overlooked obstacles the federal marijuana ban creates for state tax collection efforts,
see Mikos, State Taxation, supra note 22, at 248-61.
LAND
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could detect 100% of all sales reported to the state tax agency, in contrast to
only 5% of all unreported sales.87 In this case, the distributor would have a
strong incentive not to report to the state agency or pay the state marijuana
tax. If she reports the transactions, she now faces $10 in state tax for every
$100 in sales plus $100 in federal sanctions—a total expected “sanction” of
$110.88 By contrast, if she does not report, she faces only $20 in expected
state sanctions and another $5 in expected federal sanctions, for a total of
only $25 in expected sanctions. The dramatic increase in the probability of
being caught and sanctioned by the federal government makes reporting
extremely costly to regulated parties and seriously undermines state
information-gathering programs.
Since the work product of state gumshoe detectives can also be commandeered by the federal government, this information-gathering strategy
can also be undermined by federal commandeering. As discussed above,
gumshoe detectives frequently depend on cooperation from private citizens—crime victims, witnesses, etc.—in conducting their investigations.
Citizens may be less forthcoming, however, if the information they give to
state agents is turned over to federal law enforcement. Immigrant communities, for example, seem reluctant to cooperate with local police departments because they fear local police will share information about their own
(or a loved one’s) immigration status with federal immigration authorities.89
In short, whether states gather information via their own agents or citizens,
they will have a harder time getting that information when the federal
government threatens to take it and use it for its own purposes.

87 In this example, the federal government could increase the probability of detecting unreported sales by commandeering the investigatory files of the state’s tax agency. That would
increase the probability of detection for unreported sales by up to 10%, but it would not
dramatically alter the incentive to report.
88 Even if the federal government pursues cases against only a portion of reported sales, it
could still tip the balance against reporting. Indeed, in this example, the federal government
would need to prosecute only 11% of reported sales to make the total cost of reporting (here, $21)
exceed the cost of not reporting ($20).
89 See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1476-77 (2006) (“Deportation of unauthorized aliens who report crimes to the
police is described [by supporters of sanctuary policies] as harming relations between the police
and those citizens and legal aliens who may be family members or associates of the deported
alien.” (citation omitted)); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 604 (2008) (suggesting that one rationale behind local
sanctuary laws is to increase cooperation between immigrant populations and the police,
presumably to increase the reporting of information relevant for law enforcement purposes).
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The severity of the disruption to state information gathering depends on
the marginal expected federal sanction attributable to commandeering.90
The expected federal sanction due to commandeering is a function of two
variables. First, it depends on the magnitude of the gross sanction that
would be imposed by the federal government as a result of having the
information. In some situations, of course, the federal sanction is small or
even nonexistent, as is the disruption to state information gathering. In
Nevada, for example, state regulators closely monitor brothels—legal in
some counties—in order to protect the health of prostitutes and customers.91 Among other things, the state requires prostitutes to undergo regular
health tests to screen for various sexually transmitted diseases.92 The state
succeeds at gathering such sensitive information because (1) prostitutes gain
a lucrative benefit by reporting themselves—namely, the state’s permission
to engage in the sex trade; and (2) the federal government does not punish
prostitution.93 In other situations, by contrast, the threatened federal
sanction is large, and commandeering threatens to disrupt the flow of
information to the state. The federal sanctions for marijuana distribution,
for example, are quite large: distributors face long prison terms, large fines,
and civil forfeiture actions under federal law.94 Distributors might forego
reporting to state regulators—and whatever regulatory benefits such
regulators offered them—to avoid these federal sanctions.95 Similarly,

90 See Mikos, Enforcing State Law, supra note 83, at 1435-41 (discussing the factors in another
legal context that help determine the effect of federal supplemental sanctions on a defendant’s
efforts in resisting a state criminal conviction).
91 For a discussion of Nevada’s unique regulatory approach to prostitution, see generally
Daria Snadowsky, Note, The Best Little Whorehouse is Not in Texas: How Nevada’s Prostitution Laws
Serve Public Policy, and How Those Laws May be Improved, 6 NEV. L.J. 217, 226-34 (2005).
92 Id. at 227-29.
93 To be sure, Congress has proscribed certain prostitution-related activities, but Nevada’s
industry does not necessarily violate any of these federal laws. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1384 (2006)
(banning prostitution “[w]ithin such reasonable distance of any” military base).
94 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (enumerating penalties for the illegal distribution of controlled
substances, including marijuana).
95 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 85. People who do not face federal sanctions—and are not
affiliated with anyone else who does—presumably would not care if or how the federal government uses the information they provide. However, such disinterested third-party sources of
information are likely to be rare, especially when the activity being regulated is private and
consensual. In any event, even this modest source of information could disappear if the parties
who do face sanctions try harder to conceal it from disinterested third-parties.
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deportation is clearly harsh enough to dissuade some immigrant communities from cooperating with state law enforcement.96
Second, the disruption also depends on how much the commandeering
of the state’s information would increase the probability of being detected
by the federal government. For example, if a citizen is sure to be caught by
federal authorities anyway, the marginal cost of providing incriminating
information to the state will be zero, no matter how large the gross federal
sanction. She would report her activity to the state despite the threat of
commandeering, as long as state law gave her sufficient inducement to do
so. More realistically, however, the probability of being detected by federal
authorities absent commandeering will be less than one—indeed, in many
cases, the probability approaches zero.97 The point of commandeering
states’ secrets is, after all, to boost detection of federal offenses that would
otherwise escape detection or be difficult to prove.
In a related vein, the disruption also depends on citizens’ expectations
about whether the federal government would actually commandeer information. The federal government does not demand all of the information
gathered by the states, even though it arguably could (given current law).
For example, until recently, the federal government seemed reluctant to
commandeer state medical marijuana registries, perhaps reflecting a
reluctance to prosecute medical marijuana patients.98 It stands to reason that
if citizens believe the federal government will not commandeer (or use) the
information, commandeering’s theoretical availability will not necessarily
burden state information gathering.99

96 See Mikos, Enforcing State Law, supra note 83, at 1444-56 (discussing, in a related context,
the effect that deportation can have on unauthorized aliens’ incentives to contest state criminal
charges).
97 See supra Section I.B (discussing the federal government’s limited detection capacity).
98 See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1443 (“As a practical matter, most people
can smoke marijuana for any purpose without having to worry much about being caught and
punished by the federal government.”).
99 For this reason, the states have enjoyed some successes in monitoring federally proscribed
behaviors. In many states, for example, large numbers of residents have registered to use medical
marijuana. Even these apparent successes, however, are somewhat misleading. One never knows
how much information has been withheld because of the threat of commandeering. In Maine, for
example, state lawmakers complained that many medical marijuana users were not registering with
the state out of fears their information could be used by the federal government. See Richardson,
supra note 85. In fact, the state abandoned the mandatory registration model due to such fears. See
22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2425 (9-A) (2012) (“Registration . . . is voluntary for a
qualifying patient . . . . Failure to register under this section does not affect authorized conduct
for a qualifying patient . . . .”). In addition, the states’ successes may prove to be their undoing,
because their information will be even more valuable to federal officials when it is more complete,
thereby increasing the probability of commandeering.
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Nevertheless, the fact that commandeering is not inevitable mitigates,
but does not eliminate, the costs imposed on the states. After all, the mere
threat of federal commandeering—even if it does not materialize—may be
enough to discourage some citizens from supplying states with information.
Maine, for example, recently ended its compulsory medical marijuana
registration system in part out of concerns that the system could be coopted and exploited by federal agents.100 Barring constitutional protection
for states’ secrets, there can be no assurance the federal government will
refrain from commandeering altogether,101 and the mere threat of commandeering will continue to burden the states. In any event, as discussed above,
federal agents have not hesitated to demand very sensitive information
from the states in the past.
This particular cost of commandeering is very similar to the cost
incurred whenever a privilege is denied. As the Court explained in Jaffee
v. Redmond, “Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which
litigants such as petitioner seek access—for example, admissions against
interest by a party—is unlikely to come into being.”102 To replace the
information lost due to the threat of commandeering, the states must do at
least one of two things. First, states must employ more government agents
to pry into regulated activity in order to inspect, investigate, interrogate,
spy, etc. Or, second, states must grant information providers even deeper
regulatory concessions to compensate for the concomitant exposure to
federal authorities. The former tactic has obvious financial costs, and
employing government agents to monitor activities closely raises serious
privacy concerns as well. The latter tactic has costs that are tougher to
describe and monetize, but are no less real or troubling. In essence, state
regulators must adjust their laws to boost cooperation that would be
forthcoming but for the threat of commandeering. The threat of commandeering forecloses the optimal balance the states could otherwise strike between
severity and enforceability.
B. The Political Costs
Commandeering states’ secrets inflicts a second, and potentially more
serious, harm on state officials. It forces them to help the federal government enforce and administer policies they or their constituents oppose.

100
101

See supra note 85.
For a discussion of why the political process cannot be trusted to safeguard states’ secrets,
see infra Section IV.D.
102 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996).
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What is more, such commandeering of the states’ information-gathering
apparatus blurs the lines of accountability for unpopular enforcement
actions.
Congress and the states disagree over how, and even whether, a wide
range of private activities should be curbed. On the one hand, the federal
government unequivocally bans a number of activities it deems inherently
dangerous or immoral, including the distribution of marijuana,103 the
provision of controversial abortion procedures,104 and the possession of
machine guns.105 On the other hand, states sometimes permit these very
same activities, rejecting the federal government’s harsh zero-tolerance
approach, for one of two main reasons. First, like the federal government, a
state might condemn an activity on deontological or instrumental grounds
but nonetheless, might reject zero-tolerance as a cost-prohibitive or inefficacious solution and instead carve out a more tolerant approach that focuses
on reducing the harms associated with the activity.106 For example, several
state and local governments have legalized Syringe Exchange Programs
(SEPs),107 which provide free, sterile hypodermic syringes to heroin
users.108 SEPs are not designed to reduce the rate of intravenous drug abuse
but rather one of its most serious harms: the transmission of blood-borne
diseases among syringe-sharing users.109 The federal government, by

103 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006) (declaring it unlawful “to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense[] a controlled substance”).
104 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (“Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.”).
105 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or
possess a machinegun [sic].”).
106 For a useful taxonomy of regulatory options ranging between zero-tolerance and absolute
legalization, see Robert MacCoun, Peter Reuter & Thomas Schelling, Assessing Alternative Drug
Control Regimes, 15 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 330, 331-38 (1996).
107 See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin & Zita Lazzarini, Prevention of HIV/AIDS Among Injection
Drug Users: The Theory and Science of Public Health and Criminal Justice Approaches to Disease
Prevention, 46 EMORY L.J. 587, 667-72 (1997) (noting that 53% of the SEPs operating in North
America listed in a 1996 survey were “legal” inasmuch as “they operated in states with no syringe
prescription laws or under exemptions to the state prescription laws allowing the SEP to
operate”).
108 SEPs perform several other services as well, including collecting used syringes from
injection-drug users, referring participants to health care services such as drug treatment, teaching
safe injection practices, and providing condoms to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases. See Syringe Exchange Programs—United States, 2005, 56 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 1164, 1164-67 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/
wk/mm5644.pdf (reporting survey results detailing the operations of SEPs).
109 For a review of the public health literature discussing the effectiveness of SEPs at reducing infections, see Gostin & Lazzarini, supra note 107, at 678-79.
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contrast, has flatly refused to fund SEPs110 and has banned the sale of drug
syringes111 out of fears that easy access to syringes may encourage illicit drug
use.112 Second, in other situations, a state might not even condemn the
activity that Congress restricts or forbids outright. Unlike the federal
government, it might believe the activity is, on balance, beneficial or at least
a matter of one’s personal choice. For example, a large and growing number
of states allow certain residents to use marijuana for medical purposes.113
Rightly or wrongly, these states have decided that the benefits of marijuana
use for qualified patients outweigh the dangers—a view the federal government has staunchly rejected.
In many policy domains, the states object to assisting the enforcement
of federal law on principled, not just instrumental, grounds. In other words,
they care about more than the burden such demands impose upon their
monitoring efforts; they also care about how their labors are being put to
use, and they strongly object to advancing federal policies they deem cruel
or offensive. The struggle over immigration policy provides but one salient
example. Many state and local governments object to federal deportation
policy, deeming it overly harsh.114 In response, a number of city governments have adopted sanctuary policies that prohibit local officials from
providing information on immigration status or other city services that

110 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 807, 125 Stat. 786, 941
(2011) (“None of the Federal funds contained in this Act may be used to distribute any needle or
syringe for the purpose of preventing the spread of blood borne pathogens in any location that has
been determined by the local public health or local law enforcement authorities to be inappropriate for such distribution.”). The ban originated in 1988 and was temporarily lifted from 2009–2011.
See Bob Egelko, GOP Restores Ban on Funding Needle Exchange, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 25, 2011, at C1
(detailing the political negotiations that led to the reinstatement of the ban).
111 21 U.S.C. § 863(a)(1) (2006) (“It is unlawful for any person . . . to sell or offer for sale
drug paraphernalia . . . .”). Importantly, however, Congress has empowered the states to
opt-out of the federal ban. See 21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(1) (providing that the ban shall not apply to
“any person authorized by local, State, or Federal law to manufacture, possess, or distribute [drug
paraphernalia]”).
112 See Kiran Patel, Research Note: Drug Consumption Rooms and Needle and Syringe Exchange
Programs, 37 J. DRUG ISSUES 737, 742 (2007) (“The main disadvantage that has been highlighted
regarding needle and syringe exchange and DCRs is that they encourage illicit drug use by
sanitizing and legitimizing the practice.”). But see Gostin & Lazzarini, supra note 107, at 680-81
(reporting that studies have found no evidence that SEPs increase the number of users or
frequency of drug use).
113 See 17 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, PROCON.ORG (last updated Aug. 13, 2012, 11:01:38 AM), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.
resource.php?resourceID=000881 (listing U.S. jurisdictions that allow varying degrees of medical
marijuana use).
114 See Rodríguez, supra note 89, at 604-05 (discussing various motivations behind the adoption of sanctuary laws).
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would assist Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in tracking
down, detaining, and deporting suspected undocumented aliens.115 Similarly, several state and local governments have recently denounced ICE’s
Secure Communities Program, which uses biometric data submitted by
states to a national criminal justice databank to identify and track down
deportable aliens.116 In part, these noncooperation policies reflect the
instrumental concern that sharing information with ICE could damage the
cities’ ability to enforce their own policies. For example, undocumented
aliens are unlikely to report crimes to police if they fear they will be turned
over to ICE; this naturally hinders the work of state and local law enforcement agencies.117 But the sanctuary policies and protests over Secure
Communities also reflect the view that local resources should not be used to
advance what many perceive to be draconian federal immigration policies.118
For example, local officials may think it unduly harsh to deport someone
who has just become the victim of a crime, even if that person is in the
country illegally.
In fact, the federal government seems most likely to seize information
from the states in order to punish activities not punished by the states.
Federal authorities may have greater need for the data states possess about
such activities, given that federal policy likely encourages people to engage
in detection avoidance. For example, ICE relies heavily upon state law
enforcement data to enforce federal immigration laws (despite the protests
noted above).119 In addition, federal authorities may be more inclined to
pursue enforcement actions when they know that doing so does not merely
displace state enforcement. In a perverse way, a state program that gener115
116

See id. at 600-05 (providing an overview of the sanctuary law movement).
See Ryan Gabrielson, Feds Circumvent State on Immigration Fingerprint Checks, CALIFORNIAWATCH, (Aug. 10, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/print/11993 (reporting that three states
had withdrawn from partnership with ICE, and that California was considering doing the same).
117 See Rodríguez, supra note 89, at 604 (explaining that municipalities pass sanctuary laws to
enhance trust between immigrant residents and law enforcement); see also Kittrie, supra note 89, at
1475 (“The predominant reason local officials give for sanctuary policies has been the desire to
encourage unauthorized aliens to report crimes to which they are victims or witnesses.”).
118 See Rodríguez, supra note 89, at 604 (“[S]anctuary laws represent instances of local
officials staking out political positions in some tension with federal intentions. In the case of the
original sanctuary movement, for example, local officials expressed opposition to U.S. foreign
policy in Central America and dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to grant asylum to the
victims of that policy.”).
119 See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FACT SHEET: DELEGATION
OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY SECTION 287(G) IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT,
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (identifying sixtyfour state and local law enforcement agencies in twenty-four states that have delegated immigration enforcement authority).
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ates information about an activity the federal government proscribes could
increase the probability that federal sanctions will be imposed against the
people the states deem least deserving of it (e.g., a deportable noncitizen
who fully cooperates with a criminal investigation). It is a perverse outcome
that state regulators must consider when gathering information about an
activity that the state treats differently (and usually more leniently) than
does the federal government.
Not only are states forced to advance objectionable, and what might
otherwise be toothless, federal policies, but also state officials might be
blamed by constituents for helping federal authorities to enforce those
policies. When the federal government orders a state official to provide
information about violations of an unpopular federal law, there is a real
danger that citizens will denounce the official for being complicit in federal
law enforcement—i.e., they will label the state official a snitch and not
merely a stooge.120 For example, when a citizen is discovered and prosecuted
by the federal government using information she submitted to her state, she
might blame the state official who disclosed the information to the federal
government, especially if that official had earlier vouchsafed her confidentiality.121
It hardly seems fair to blame state officials for exposing secrets under
federal court orders. State officials cannot simply disregard such orders
because they can be fined or imprisoned for doing so.122 Nor can state
officials do much to challenge such orders; as discussed below, most
challenges prove futile under the current interpretation of federal statutory
and constitutional law. But as a practical matter, their constituents might
easily draw the conclusion that state officials who provide information to
federal authorities disregard their needs and interests.

120 The label “snitch” (i.e., informer) evokes a powerful negative connotation. See, e.g., Alan
Feuer & Al Baker, Officers’ Arrests Put Spotlight On Police Use of Informants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2008, Metro Section, at A25 (discussing public backlash against citizens who provide information
to assist criminal investigations).
121 The recent uproar over the Michigan State Attorney General’s decision to abide by a
federal subpoena seeking privileged medical marijuana registration information illustrates the
political dangers posed by commandeering. See e.g., John Agar, Back Off, Attorney General Urged Lawyer Claims State’s Top Lawman Has Conflict in Medical Pot Case, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS
(Mich.), Jan. 13, 2011, at A5 (reporting that intervening counsel had criticized Michigan Attorney
General for providing federal agents with sensitive information from the state’s medical marijuana
registry); Barrie Barber, Recall Targets AG’s Medical Pot Stance, SAGINAW NEWS (Mich.), July 21,
2011, at A4 (reporting that a recall petition was launched to oust the Attorney General based on his
lack of support of the state law permitting medicinal use of marijuana).
122 See infra note 296 (identifying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g) and various
federal statutes as providing authority for such sanctions).
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Moreover, state officials cannot easily warn citizens in advance of the
prospects of commandeering in order to redirect blame back onto the
federal government. Commandeering is unpredictable. With the exception
of statutory reporting requirements, the federal government does not warn
state officials that the data they are collecting will later be seized to enforce
federal law. State officials have no reliable way to predict which data the
federal government will seize down the road. To be sure, state officials
could provide a standard disclaimer every time they seek to extract sensitive
information from their citizens.123 But doing so could exacerbate the
economic costs of commandeering by leading citizens to overestimate the
threat of commandeering.
Currently, the only way state officials can avoid serving as the tools of
federal law enforcement is to take the drastic step of abandoning monitoring altogether. In practical effect, this means abandoning enforcement of
the regulations for which data collection was required in the first place.
Importantly, even when a state objects to the restrictions federal law
imposes on a particular activity, it may still want to impose some restrictions of its own. For example, almost every state that has legalized
marijuana for medicinal purposes continues to ban use of the drug for other
purposes.124 But abandoning data collection on medicinal marijuana renders
the enforcement of this legal distinction difficult, if not impossible. What is
more, state officials might be unfairly blamed for undetected and unpunished violations of state law because of the choice to abandon careful
monitoring. It is not likely that constituents would understand that the
threat of commandeering motivated this choice. Thus, while abandoning
information gathering insulates a state official from being perceived as a
snitch, it also exposes the official to being perceived as incompetent for
failing to enforce state law.
The threat of having their labor co-opted for objectionable purposes
puts state lawmakers in a dilemma. On the one hand, if state officials gather
information on activities that are also (or someday may be) regulated by the
federal government, they might later be forced to provide that information

123 For example, “WARNING: ANYTHING YOU TELL US CAN BE USED AGAINST
YOU BY FEDERAL AUTHORITIES.”
124 See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1427 (“[O]utside the context of recently
enacted medical use exemptions . . . marijuana remains a strictly forbidden and usually (though
not always) criminal drug at the state level.”). Colorado and Washington recently legalized
marijuana for recreational purposes, but even these states impose some constraints on who may
use and distribute the drug. See Joel Millman & Nathan Koppel, Pot Measures’ Passage Puts States in
Quandary, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2012, at A14.
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to federal authorities and thereby help administer objectionable federal
policies. Doing so also potentially jeopardizes their own political fortunes.
On the other hand, if state officials refuse to gather such information, they
will undermine their own policy objectives. And they might still incur the
wrath of their constituents. As it stands, state lawmakers have no easy way
out of this dilemma.125
This dilemma arises in a number of contemporary policy arenas and may
help to explain some otherwise puzzling choices states have made regarding
the monitoring (or lack thereof) of regulated activities. Consider the
example of medical marijuana. Most states that have legalized medical
marijuana have adopted mechanisms to monitor the supply and use of the
drug, including patient registration systems.126 Compulsory registration
systems help state law enforcement agents quickly, cheaply, and accurately
determine who may legally possess marijuana.127 The problem, of course, is
that registration systems can also help federal law enforcement agents just
as quickly, cheaply, and accurately sanction the same individuals.128 Hence,
to avoid exposing qualified patients and their suppliers to federal authorities, a few states have eschewed compulsory registration.129 This approach
reduces the likelihood of exposing qualified patients to federal law enforcement agents, but it also permits abuse of state medical marijuana exemptions. In a no-registration state, police must determine for themselves
whether a suspect is eligible to use marijuana for medical purposes. The cost
of making such determinations in the context of a criminal investigation is

125 At first glance, this dilemma resembles the thorny choice states sometimes face when
Congress exercises its conditional preemption power. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1982) (upholding a federal law giving states the choice of either
considering suggested federal standards when passing utility regulations or abandoning such
regulations altogether). As I explain later, however, valid conditional preemption statutes afford
states some procedural protections, such as notice, that Congress sidesteps when it commandeers
states’ secrets. See infra subsection IV.C.1.
126 See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1428-29 (noting that, as of 2009, ten states
had adopted compulsory registration requirements).
127 To determine whether someone who asserts a medical marijuana defense actually meets
the eligibility requirements under state law, state police need only call a registry hotline—the
determination has already been made by a civil regulatory agency. See, e.g., 5 COLO. CODE REGS.
§ 1006-2:1.A (2011) (describing the procedures in Colorado for law enforcement to confirm an
individual’s medical registry status).
128 Indeed, federal law enforcement agents have already sought to breach the confidentiality
of state medical marijuana registries to enhance federal investigations. See supra notes 67-68.
129 See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1429 (“California, Maine, and Washington . . . impose few formal requirements on prospective users beyond obtaining [a] physician
diagnosis and recommendation.”)
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comparatively high,130 making it expensive for police to pursue criminal
charges against suspects who claim a medical need for the drug, even when
their claim seems disingenuous. The lack of monitoring has contributed to
abuse of medical marijuana laws in some states131—a price these states
appear willing to pay to protect qualified patients and suppliers from federal
law enforcement.132
*

*

*

In sum, commandeering states’ secrets imposes two costs on the states.
First, by increasing the incentives of citizens to conceal activity from state
regulators, the threat of commandeering makes it more difficult for states to
gather information in the first place. Commandeering thus adds to the costs
of enforcing state law. Second, commandeering forces state officials to help
advance federal policies that they or their constituents deem objectionable.
What is more, state officials might be unfairly blamed for providing
information to federal officials and advancing controversial federal policies.
Importantly, state officials cannot easily anticipate federal demands for
information and cannot avoid assisting federal agents once they have
already gathered information.
III. REBUFFING STATE AUTONOMY: THE PREVAILING VIEW
REGARDING DEMANDS FOR STATES’ SECRETS
Not surprisingly, the states go to great lengths to block access to the
most sensitive information they gather about private citizens. They
frequently bar private citizens from accessing the information altogether,
and they restrict government agents from accessing or using it for unap-

130 For instance, suspects could refuse to answer questions about their eligibility, full-blown
judicial hearings might be required, etc. See Mikos, State Taxation, supra note 22, at 230 (discussing
the higher costs associated with criminal versus civil proceedings).
131 See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Medical Marijuana Industry Is Unnerved by U.S. Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at A22 (“It is . . . an open secret that a share of doctor-approved
[marijuana] buyers do not have plausible medical needs.”)
132 Maine, for example, has recently abandoned a short-lived mandatory registration system
at least partially to prevent federal exploitation of the system. Richardson, supra note 85
(discussing the privacy concerns motivating the legislative change, including the possible risk of
federal intervention); see also ME. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MAINE MEDICAL
USE OF MARIJUANA PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2011), available at http://www.maine.gov/
dhhs/dlrs/reports/mmm-program-report-3-2011.pdf (reporting patients’ “concerns about confidentiality of their medical information . . . even though the information is protected by statute”).
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proved purposes.133 States may, of course, bar their own law enforcement
agencies, grand juries, and courts from accessing information. But do states
have any such authority vis-à-vis comparable federal institutions? What happens
if a state does not want to give information to the federal government?
In most cases, a federal agency or grand jury must enlist the help of a
federal court to enforce its demands against a recalcitrant state.134 This Part
discusses in detail the legal arguments raised by states to challenge demands
for states’ secrets. Section A examines the Supreme Court’s constitutional
federalism doctrines. It explains why those doctrines, as presently applied
by the lower federal courts, do not stop the federal government from
requiring state officials to provide information to it. Sections B and C then
explain why federal statutory privileges and statutorily imposed reasonableness requirements likewise do not constrain the federal government’s ability
to subpoena confidential state records. Section D suggests that federal
constitutional privileges—most notably, the privilege against selfincrimination—afford, at best, only very limited protection against the use
of states’ secrets. In summary, under extant understandings of legal
doctrine, the federal government may seize almost any information the
states possess and use that information to enforce federal law.
A. Constitutional Federalism
The conventional wisdom is that constitutional federalism doctrines do
not prohibit the federal government from forcing the states to disclose
information. Here I discuss how that conclusion was established in conventional wisdom. Later, I show why this view is misguided: as a matter of
both normative and positive legal theory, constitutional federalism juris-

133 For example, states strictly limit access to medical marijuana registries. Generally speaking, only designated employees of a state health agency may access the registries and then, only
for approved purposes, such as verifying whether someone already under investigation is properly
registered. Violation of these strict confidentiality provisions is a criminal offense. For example,
the Colorado Constitution restricts access to information in the state medical marijuana registry to
“authorized employees of the state health agency in the course of their official duties” and
“authorized employees of state or local law enforcement agencies which have stopped or arrested a
person who claims to be engaged in the medical use of marijuana . . . .” COLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 14(3)(a). The same constitutional provision requires the state legislature to criminalize
“[b]reach[es] of confidentiality of information provided to or by the state health agency.” Id.
§ 14(8)(d).
134 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 74, § 8.4(c) (characterizing a grand jury as powerless
without the enforcement powers of the court); DOJ REPORT, supra note 58, at 5 (“All federal
executive branch administrative subpoenas are enforced by the courts.”).
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prudence should and, upon closer inspection, already does, limit the federal
government’s power to commandeer states’ secrets.
1. The Tenth Amendment Claim
The states have raised two basic arguments challenging federal demands
for information on constitutional federalism grounds. The more common
argument, prominent since the 1970s, seeks to use the Tenth Amendment as
a shield against disclosure of government records.135 Though the contours of
the argument tend to vary, the basic claim is that the Tenth Amendment
immunizes essential state governmental functions—in this case, the keeping
of confidential records by state agencies—from any federal regulation.
The nebulous claim that the Tenth Amendment insulates state functions
from federal regulation altogether has been discredited since Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority136 overruled National League of Cities v.
Usery.137 In National League of Cities, the Court had held that the Tenth
Amendment precludes Congress from enforcing federal labor laws against
states in areas of “traditional government functions.”138 The Court ruled
that “Congress may not exercise [its Commerce] power so as to force
directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding
the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made.”139 Only
nine years later, however, the Court abandoned National League of Cities in
Garcia, rejecting “as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule
of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of
whether a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”140
In light of the quick demise of National League of Cities, it should come
as no surprise that the lower courts have readily dismissed the Tenth
Amendment challenge to demands for state records. Citing the Supremacy
Clause, the courts have upheld federal demands for the confidential records
of state juvenile courts,141 a state attorney general,142 state tax agencies, 143

135
136
137

For related cases, see infra notes 141-49.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
426 U.S. 833 (1976). See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531 (abandoning the “function” standard first
established in National League of Cities because it was “unworkable” and “inconsistent with established
principles of federalism”).
138 426 U.S. at 852.
139 Id. at 855.
140 469 U.S. at 546-47.
141 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 929 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1991) (“Even if the juvenile
proceedings had been sealed pursuant to state law, that law could not bar consideration of them by
a federal court in determining a sentence when federal law provides otherwise.”).
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state medical boards,144 state probation offices,145 and sundry other records
privileged by state law, for use in federal criminal and civil cases.146 In one
case, for example, the Attorney General of Illinois challenged a federal
grand jury subpoena of arguably confidential records from his office on the
grounds that the subpoena was “an unconstitutional federal ‘excursion’ into
the territory of exclusive state sovereignty,” because “certain state functions
are immune from subpoena.”147 The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected his
argument, holding that “[n]othing in the United States Constitution
immunizes any exclusive domain of the state from the reach of a federal
grand jury.”148 As another court explained more recently, a state privilege
law that obstructs the enforcement of a federal subpoena must give way to
federal policy.149 In that case, Michigan’s health agency sought to quash the
DEA’s subpoena of the state medical marijuana registry, because the
subpoena conflicted with a strict state confidentiality provision forbidding

142 See, e.g., In re Special Apr. 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 593 n.3, 595 (7th Cir. 1978)
(asserting that the Supremacy Clause requires a state attorney general to disclose subpoenaed
records of his office to a federal grand jury).
143 See, e.g., United States v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 807 F. Supp. 237, 240-43
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that a state law shielding a tax agency’s records from disclosure was
preempted due to a conflict with a congressional statute authorizing administrative subpoenas); In
re Grand Jury Empanelled Jan. 21, 1981, 535 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1982) (rejecting a Tenth
Amendment challenge to a grand jury subpoena of confidential state taxpayer records); In re N.Y.
State Sales Tax Records, 382 F. Supp. 1205, 1206 (W.D.N.Y. 1974) (“The powers of the federal
grand jury, because of . . . the supremacy clause . . . must prevail over the nondisclosure
provision . . . of the New York State Tax Law.”).
144 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter, 762 F. Supp. 333, 335-36 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (rejecting, in a
grand jury investigation of mail fraud by a physician, the invocation of state privilege law by a
state medical board to resist turning over records of patient complaints).
145 See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 1992) (ruling that probation records could be used to impeach a witness in a federal trial, despite a “contrary state statute”
privileging the report); United States v. Holmes, 594 F.2d 1167, 1171 (8th Cir. 1979) (denying the
existence of a “‘probation officer’ privilege” and asserting the supremacy of “the federal law of
privileges”).
146 The courts have rejected similar constitutional arguments by private litigants asserting
state privileges to protect their documents. See, e.g., Mem’l Hosp. for McHenry Cnty. v. Shadur,
664 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that in a federal antitrust suit, a state law barring
disclosure of medical peer review records did not govern and was “rendered void and of no effect”
by the Supremacy Clause).
147 In re Special Apr. 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1978).
148 Id. (internal citation omitted).
149 See United States v. Mich. Dep’t. of Cmty. Health, No. 10-109, 2011 WL 2412602, at *13
(W.D. Mich. June 9, 2011) (explaining that the state’s claim conflicted with, and was thus
subordinate to, federal policy).
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such disclosure.150 The court rejected the claim, reasoning that the confidentiality provision
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ by preventing the federal government
from using a proper federal subpoena to obtain records which involve a
controlled substance, the use of which is prohibited by federal law, i.e.,
marijuana and marijuana plants. The . . . confidentiality provision must
be and is nullified to the extent it conflicts with the federal law by preventing the federal government’s exercise of its subpoena power under [21
U.S.C.] § 876.151

2. The Anti-Commandeering Rule
The second and more plausible constitutional federalism argument is
that demands for state agencies to provide information for use in federal
investigations violate the anti-commandeering rule. The anticommandeering rule prohibits the federal government from commanding
state legislatures to enact federally scripted regulatory programs, and from
commanding state executive officials to help administer federal regulatory
programs.152 In Printz v. United States, the Court invalidated a provision of
the Brady Act that compelled state law enforcement agents to perform
background checks on prospective gun buyers.153 The process entailed
searching and analyzing state criminal records databases to determine
whether a prospective gun buyer was barred by federal law from completing
the transaction.154 In New York v. United States, the Court invalidated
provisions of a congressional statute that compelled state legislatures to find

150
151

Id. at *1-6.
Id. at *13 (quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713

(1985)).
152 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“Congress cannot compel the States
to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent
that prohibition by conscripting the States’ officers directly.”). For thoughtful commentary on the
anti-commandering rule, see generally Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of
Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71; Caminker, supra note 16;
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes
Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism
and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998).
153 521 U.S. at 935.
154 See id. at 902-04 (describing the regulatory program imposed upon the states by the
Brady Act).
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storage sites for radioactive waste generated by private firms or else assume
legal responsibility for such waste.155
The anti-commandeering cases seem to provide a doctrinal basis to challenge federal demands for information. As I have explained in depth
elsewhere, the anti-commandeering rule effectively circumscribes federal
supremacy.156 Even though it neither circumscribes Congress’s power over
private citizens, nor insulates state functions from federal regulation
altogether, the rule protects the states from being compelled to enforce
federal regulatory programs. In other words, it empowers the states to
engage in a form of passive resistance to federal authority—in essence, to
say “no” to demands for assistance in the enforcement of federal law.
In the wake of Printz and New York, a few states have challenged federal
demands for information by likening them to prohibited commandeering.157
However, the courts that have addressed this argument have dismissed the
comparison for at least one of two reasons. First, some lower courts have
simply presumed that providing information about violations of federal law
does not amount to enforcing federal law.158 These courts have carved out a
categorical distinction between demands for information about federally
regulated activity and demands for other types of administrative services.
The latter are subject to the anti-commandeering rule, but the former,
somehow, are not.
This distinction is inspired by a short line of dicta by Justice Scalia, the
author of the Printz majority decision. In a portion of his opinion delving
into the historical practice of commandeering state executives, Justice Scalia
found that the practice was exceedingly rare.159 In making this conclusion,
he discounted the relevance of a number of statutes cited by the government “which require only the provision of information to the Federal
Government,” in part, because they “do not involve the precise issue before us
here, which is the forced participation of the States’ executive in the actual
administration of a federal program.”160 In other words, Justice Scalia
seemed to suggest that demands for information were categorically different

155
156

505 U.S. 144, 150-54 (1992).
See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1445-50 (describing how “the anticommandeering doctrine constrains Congress’s preemption power”).
157 See, e.g., City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting
the city’s claim that congressional statutes had commandeered city officials into providing
immigration data to the federal law enforcement agencies), aff’g 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
158 See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (discussing relevant cases).
159 Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
160 Id. (emphasis added).
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than other demands placed upon the state executive. In concurring with the
Court’s opinion, Justice O’Connor shared Justice Scalia’s apparent reluctance to condemn information-reporting requirements. She praised the
Court for “appropriately refrain[ing] from deciding whether other purely
ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local
authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid.”161
Taking cues from the Printz dicta, several lower courts have dismissed
the notion that providing information in any way constitutes assisting the
enforcement of a federal regulatory program.162 In Freilich v. Board of
Directors of Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., for example, the District Court of
Maryland dismissed a challenge to a federal law that requires state medical
boards to receive and forward adverse peer review decisions made by
private hospitals to the federal government’s National Practitioner Data
Bank.163 Calling the challenge “completely meritless,” the court hastily
dismissed any comparison to prohibited commandeering: “The federal
government has not compelled the states to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program—rather, the government is asking the states to provide
information regarding their own state administered regulatory programs.
This has never been held to violate the Tenth Amendment.”164 In another
decision, the Southern District of New York rejected a similar challenge to
a federal law that requires state law enforcement agencies to report the
known whereabouts of convicted sex offenders to a federal agency. The
court held that because the law “only requires states to provide information
rather than administer or enforce a federal program,” it does not violate the
anti-commandeering rule.165

161
162

Id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See, e.g., City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34-35 (suggesting that Printz distinguished between
federal demands for state information and federal directives to participate in a regulatory
program).
163 See 142 F. Supp. 2d 679, 694-97 (D. Md. 2001) (describing the relevant federal requirement and the court’s reasoning for finding it constitutional), aff’d sub nom. Freilich v. Upper
Chesapeake Health, Inc. (Freilich II), 313 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2002). For the federal requirement,
see 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)-(b) (2006).
164 Freilich, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (emphasis added). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit was
comparably dismissive. See Freilich II, 313 F.3d 205 at 214 (finding that “more is required . . . to
offend the Tenth Amendment” than the “expenditure of time and effort” to submit reports to the
Board of Medical Examiners).
165 United States v. Brown, No. 07-485, 2007 WL 4372829 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007)
(emphasis added), aff’d 328 Fed. Appx. 57 (2d Cir. 2009).
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The academic literature on the anti-commandeering rule generally pays
little attention to the distinction noted by the Printz Court.166 For the most
part, the scholarship addressing particular demands for information and
similar practices has presumed that Printz settled the question of their
constitutionality.167 For example, one commentator has declared that “the
anti-commandeering doctrine does not apply to any regulation of the states
as the owners of databases, including federal laws requiring disclosure of
information to the federal government.”168
Second, lower courts have also distinguished demands for information
from demands for other services by suggesting that the former do not
trigger the structural harms that animated the Printz and New York decisions. In those cases, the Court emphasized the economic and political costs
commandeering imposed upon the states—namely, the burden they would
bear in having to administer federal programs and the political responsibility they would shoulder if those programs proved unpopular with constituents.169 In essence, several lower courts have concluded that forcing states to
share information is not at all burdensome to the states,170 or at least, not
burdensome enough to trump the federal government’s interest in obtaining
information.171 It should be noted, however, that no court has yet considered the political costs of commandeering states’ secrets.

166 One notable exception is Caminker, supra note 16, at 234; see id. (arguing that “it is
[u]nclear . . . on what basis reporting requirements can meaningfully be distinguished from
‘actual administration of a federal program.’” (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 918) (majority opinion)).
For an elaboration of this point, see infra Section IV.A.
167 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 MO. L. REV.
285, 374 n.332 (2003) (“In Printz v. United States, the Court suggested that a constitutional
prohibition against the federal ‘commandeering’ of state officials does not extend to federal
mandates requiring state data collection and maintenance.”); Kittrie, supra note 89, at 1492
(arguing that the “enactment of federal legislation specifically requiring state and local officials to
disclose . . . information to the federal government” would be constitutional). But see Rebecca
E. Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 141, 166 n.165 (2002) (noting that the Printz Court did not resolve whether
demanding information possessed by a state agency would constitute commandeering).
168 Kittrie, supra note 89, at 1492 (emphasis added).
169 See, e.g., Young, supra note 13, at 16 (stating that the anti-commandeering doctrine requires Congress to internalize the costs of its own programs, rather than passing them on to the
states).
170 See, e.g., In re Special Apr. 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1978) (suggesting
that “the impact of a subpoena on state functions is markedly different from the Usery direct
system of regulation that requires a reallocation of state resources”).
171 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena for N.Y. State Income Tax Records, 468 F. Supp.
575, 577 (N.D.N.Y.) (holding that the state interest in fostering truthful tax reporting by
promising confidentiality is “more than counterbalanced by the necessity of thorough grand jury
investigations into violations of federal law”).
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To reach the conclusion that demands for information do not consume
state resources in the way that demands for other services do, these lower
courts have emphasized that the federal government generally demands
information that a state already has on hand. In such a situation, to these
courts, commandeering is not necessarily harmful because the state would
not need to expend resources to get the information, and therefore, would
not need to divert resources from local priorities to satisfy federal demands.172 In economic terms, the information sought is a nonrivalrous
public good. The federal government’s use of the information does not
detract from the state’s use of it. For example, the federal government could
use a state’s investigative files in a federal prosecution against Joe Smith,
and the state could use the same files to prosecute Joe Smith as well.173
In the Freilich case, for example, the court struggled to discern, amid a
lack of presented evidence, how “requiring state medical boards to forward
information on to a national data bank would be burdensome or would
impede state sovereignty.”174 In another case, the court brushed aside
concerns over the federal government’s demand that a state report information about sex offenders in its jurisdiction to the FBI, because it was
“information that the state officials will typically already have through their
own state [sex-offender] registries.”175
Similarly, some legal scholars, while acknowledging that Printz may not
have definitively resolved the constitutionality of demands for information,
have nonetheless expressed support for such a rule on the grounds that
demands for information are not harmful. Professor Rick Hills, for instance,
has argued that Congress should be allowed to commandeer some information from the states in certain circumstances, such as demands for
information that will not require states to issue commands to their own
citizens or for information states possess that the federal government has no

172 Protecting state prerogatives is frequently cited as one of the rationales behind the anticommandeering rule. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula
for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1583 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court should
protect the autonomy of the states, “especially the right of state voters to set their own legislative
agendas and choose tasks for their own government administrators”).
173 Such prosecution by separate sovereigns does not violate the Double Jeopardy clause of
the Constitution. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (“[A]n act denounced as a crime
by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and
may be punished by each.” (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).
174 Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs. of Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 679, 697 (D.
Md. 2001).
175 United States v. Brown, No. 07-485, 2007 WL 4372829 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007)
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other way of obtaining.176 Similarly, Professor Vicki Jackson has suggested
that “relatively minor recordkeeping, record-checking, or informationproviding” demands should be distinguished from “more substantial impositions on state resources involving matters that (even if directed at executive
officials) come close to the core of legislative responsibilities.”177 But these
commentators do not provide any sustained or detailed analysis to support
their assertions.
To be sure, a few courts have recognized the dynamic costs that commandeering can impose on the states. Yet, these courts have nonetheless
upheld demands for information by finding those costs eclipsed by the
federal government’s interest in obtaining information. In one prominent
case, City of New York v. United States, the Second Circuit dismissed New
York City’s challenge to provisions of two 1996 congressional statutes that
gave the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) greater access to
confidential state records concerning the immigration status of residents.178
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, for
example, provides: “[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or official
may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official
from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful
or unlawful, of any individual.”179 The city objected to sharing the information it had acquired concerning the immigration status of crime victims
and certain other persons. Since 1989, it had a policy that forbade city
employees from providing such information to the INS.180 It brought a
facial challenge to the information disclosure provisions of the federal laws,

176 See Hills, supra note 152, at 933-34 (providing a theoretical framework to justify these
exceptions to the anti-commandeering rule); see also Mary D. Fan, Reforming the Criminal Rap
Sheet: Federal Timidity and the Traditional State Functions Doctrine, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 31, 69-72
(2005) (suggesting that Congress could commandeer states to provide uniform criminal history
information because of the strong need for such information in federal criminal prosecutions).
177 Jackson, supra note 152, at 2253-54 (emphasis added).
178 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the city’s challenge to provisions of the 1996
Welfare Reform Act and the 1996 Immigration Reform Act).
179 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 642(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 434, 110 Stat. 2275 (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1644)
(imposing a similar prohibition).
180 City of New York, 179 F.3d at 31-32 (discussing an Executive Order issued by then-Mayor
Edward Koch).
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drawing heavily from the Court’s new anti-commandeering decision in
Printz.181
After suggesting that Printz was inapplicable to demands for information, the court nonetheless proceeded to apply a balancing test pitting
the city’s interest in confidentiality against the federal government’s
apparent need for the information in dispute.182 The court did recognize an
abstract concern for maintaining the confidentiality of state records:
The City’s concerns [over the federal requirements] are not insubstantial.
The obtaining of pertinent information, which is essential to the performance of a wide variety of state and local governmental functions, may in
some cases be difficult or impossible if some expectation of confidentiality is
not preserved.183

Nevertheless, it downplayed the city’s concerns because the confidentiality policy apparently applied only against the INS. To the court, the fact
that the city freely shared the same information among its own agencies
suggested that the marginal harm of disclosing it to the INS was minimal.184
The court suggested that so far as the city’s only rationale for nondisclosure was “to reduce the effectiveness of a federal policy,”185 its
concerns were illegitimate and entitled to no weight whatsoever: “The
City’s sovereignty argument asks us to turn the Tenth Amendment’s shield
against the federal government’s using state and local governments to enact
and administer federal programs into a sword allowing states and localities
to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal programs.”186 The
court found that, “[a]bsent any cooperation at all from local officials, some
federal programs may fail or fall short of their goals,” so the federal
government must be allowed to commandeer information from the states.187
I will argue that the distinction between commandeering of other state
services and the commandeering of the states’ information-gathering

181 The city contended that the Tenth Amendment “includes the power to choose not to
participate in federal regulatory programs and that such power in turn includes the authority to
forbid state or local agencies, officials, and employees from aiding such a program even on a
voluntary basis.” Id. at 34.
182 Id. at 34-35.
183 Id. at 36.
184 See id. at 37 (“[T]he Executive Order does not on its face prevent the sharing of information with anyone outside the INS.”).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 35. In this passage, the court fundamentally misconstrues the essence of the anticommandeering rule, which authorizes passive resistance to federal authority. See infra Section IV.B.
187 City of New York, 179 F.3d at 35.
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capacity is entirely unpersuasive: demands for state information should be
considered prohibited commandeering, regardless of the impact on federal
enforcement or the state’s motivation for nondisclosure. Indeed, this view is
arguably more consistent with the precise holdings of and instrumental
rationale underlying the Court’s anti-commandeering precedent. As it
stands, however, no federal court has yet ruled that information-reporting
requirements imposed by Congress, executive agencies, or grand juries
violate constitutional federalism doctrines in general or the anticommandeering rule in particular. Similarly, legal scholars have largely
overlooked the harms of commandeering states’ secrets and have neglected
to scrutinize the judicial decisions upholding the practice.
B. Statutory Privileges
In the alternative, states have sought to argue that federal common law,
statutory law, or both privilege the information states treat as confidential.
As one court has surmised, however, “courts consistently have rejected the
view that state records are privileged from disclosure even in cases in which
state law prohibited the disclosure of the records.”188
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs the recognition of privileges in
federal proceedings.189 It does not enumerate any privileges, but instead
instructs the courts to develop a federal common law of privilege using
“reason and experience” as their guides.190 Generally speaking, the Supreme
Court, citing the well-worn notion that privileges hinder the judiciary’s
truth-seeking function, has discouraged the recognition of federal privileges
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 501.191 Consequently, the federal
courts have spurned the vast majority of privileges that apply to proceedings governed by state law.192 For example, the federal courts have allowed

188 In re Special Apr. 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1978) (internal citations
omitted); see also Glenn A. Guarino, Authority of Federal Grand Jury to Subpoena Documents of State
or Local Agency, 64 A.L.R. FED. 901 (Supp. 2012) (collecting cases that consider the authority of
federal grand juries to subpoena state information).
189 FED. R. EVID. 501.
190 Id. This is the standard that applies to issues governed by federal substantive law. For
issues governed by state substantive law, the courts are instructed to apply state privilege law. Id.
191 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“[E]xceptions to the demand
for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for truth.”).
192 The psychotherapist-patient privilege, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1995), attorney-client
privilege, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), and spousal privilege, Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), are among the few evidentiary privileges now recognized by federal
courts.
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government agents and private litigants to lay bare private conversations
between physicians and their patients,193 peer reviews of tenure and
performance evaluations,194 and the legislative acts of state lawmakers,195
notwithstanding the existence of state laws expressly privileging such
information.
More particularly, the federal courts have rejected or limited the two
privileges that typically shield the records kept by state agencies from
disclosure in state proceedings. Consider, first, the required reports
privilege, which bars disclosure of confidential records submitted by private
citizens to state agencies.196 It is designed to encourage candid reporting
about regulated activities.197 Most states allow the collecting agency to deny
access to private litigants and other state actors. But the federal courts
generally have not allowed state agencies to withhold the same information
from federal law enforcement agents and courts. The courts have ordered
state agencies to turn over sundry reports submitted by private citizens on
promise of confidentiality, including medical marijuana registration
forms,198 driver’s license applications,199 income tax returns,200 and contingency fee agreements,201 among others.
To be sure, as a matter of comity, the federal courts do give some consideration to the states’ interest in obtaining honest, accurate information from
their residents—the central purpose served by the required reports privilege. But that interest seems always to give way when federal authorities
assert (1) a plausible need for the information contained in the reports and
(2) an inability to obtain that information by some other, equally conven-

193 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (“The physician-patient evidentiary
privilege is unknown to the common law.”).
194 See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 195 (1990) (dismissing a comparison to privilege
governing jury deliberations and holding that “[a] privilege for peer review materials has no
similar historical or statutory basis”).
195 See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980) (“[T]he fact that there is an evidentiary privilege under the Tennessee Constitution . . . which [a state legislator] could assert
in a criminal prosecution in state court does not compel an analogous privilege in a federal
prosecution.”).
196 For background on the required reports privilege, its purposes, and its origins, see 3 JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 502 (2d ed.
2011).
197 Id.
198 E.g., United States v. Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, No. 10-109, 2011 WL 2412602, at *14
(W.D. Mich. June 9, 2011).
199 E.g., Sexton v. Poole Truck Lines, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 127, 130 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
200 E.g., United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 109 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
201 E.g., In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 383 (3d Cir. 1976).
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ient, means.202 This leaves the bulk of states’ secrets vulnerable to exposure.
The few occasions on which the courts have denied access to these reports
have involved rather unusual scenarios where either the federal official’s
need for the records was not apparent203 or Congress had expressly privileged state records204 or equivalent records submitted to federal agencies.205
Consider next a number of related privileges that apply to official information. Inter alia, these official information privileges bar the disclosure
of information gleaned by government agents during law enforcement
investigations, such as the names of cooperating witnesses and the contents
of wiretapped communications.206 Like the required reports privilege, the
official information privileges are designed to encourage cooperation with
government authorities.207 And like the required reports privilege, they may
be defeated whenever the federal government demonstrates a need for
information that outweighs the damage done to state law enforcement.208
For example, federal courts have ordered state law enforcement agencies to
reveal the names of their confidential informants209 and to disclose the results

202 See, e.g., King, 73 F.R.D. at 105 (“A strong policy of comity between state and federal
sovereignties impels federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished at
no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy.” (emphasis added)); see also Mem’l
Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting King to assert that federal courts
should consider “the law of the state in which the case arises in determining whether a privilege
should be recognized as a matter of federal law”). As one court has acknowledged, “there is almost
always such a cost to the special federal interest in seeking the truth in a federal question case.”
ACLU of Miss., Inc. v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1343 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
203 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 14, 1989, 728 F. Supp. 368, 373 (W.D.
Pa. 1990) (noting that evidence sought by the federal government was cumulative and could be
obtained elsewhere).
204 For example, Congress has privileged the records of patients in drug treatment programs.
See Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. § 2.1(a) (2011). The
pertinent regulations forbid disclosure of the identity, diagnosis, and treatment of any patient,
except under very narrow circumstances. See Id. § 2.65(d). Interestingly, state governments may
expand the scope of the privilege. In other words, the states may prohibit disclosure of patient
records that would otherwise be permitted by federal regulation. See id. § 2.20 (“If a disclosure
permitted under these regulations is prohibited under State law, neither these regulations nor the
authorizing statutes may be construed to authorize any violation of that State law.”).
205 See In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that the federal government
must follow the same rules mandated by Congress for discovery of federal tax records when it
instead seeks access to state tax records).
206 See generally WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 196, § 509.
207 Id. § 509.21.
208 See, e.g., Nat’l Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights ex rel. Perez v. City of New York, 194 F.R.D.
88, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the factors to be considered in such a balancing test).
209 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Detroit Police Dep’t Special Cash Fund), 922
F.2d 1266, 1270-72 (6th Cir. 1991) (outlining the justifications for this type of compelled
revelation). But see In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 944-45 (2d Cir. 2010) (upholding a city
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of internal investigations to federal agents.210 These disclosures have been
required despite claims that such information is privileged under state law.
C. Statutory Reasonableness
State agencies have been somewhat more successful in challenging the
reasonableness of federal subpoenas. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(c) authorizes federal courts to quash a grand jury subpoena that is
“unreasonable or oppressive,”211 and courts have upheld the power to quash
administrative subpoenas on similar grounds.212 In a handful of cases, states
have successfully challenged federal subpoenas as unreasonable,213 but these
cases remain the exception.
The Supreme Court has set a very high bar for demonstrating that a
subpoena is unreasonable.214 From the start, courts are to presume that a
subpoena is reasonable.215 To rebut that presumption, the party challenging
the subpoena must make a showing that the subpoena is vague, that the
materials sought by it are irrelevant to the federal government’s investigation, or that compliance with the subpoena would be unjustifiably burdensome.216 States are rarely able to meet this burden.

police department’s claim to law enforcement privilege in a civil rights action where the plaintiffs
sought disclosure of undercover investigative files in pretrial discovery proceedings).
210 See, e.g., United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 229-30 (3d Cir. 1980) (denying a city’s
attempt to claim privilege over materials sought by a federal civil rights commission), order
vacated, 619 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1980); EEOC v. City of Milwaukee, 919 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (E.D.
Wis. 1996) (refusing to quash subpoenas filed by the EEOC that sought confidential city records
concerning an internal investigation into employment discrimination claims against a police
department).
211 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
212 See Hughes, supra note 22, at 587 (“[T]he law pertaining to judicial scrutiny of . . . civil
investigative demands has been patterned on older principles applicable to the grand jury and,
indeed, now almost exactly mirrors the standards for challenging a grand jury subpoena.” (internal
citations omitted)). However, courts have no apparent authority to enjoin a statutory reporting
requirement simply for being unreasonable.
213 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena for THCF Med. Clinic Records, 504 F. Supp. 2d
1085, 1090 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (quashing a federal subpoena as unreasonable for having marginal
relevance to a federal investigation).
214 See, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 306 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (commenting that, in the grand jury context, “the
law enforcement interest will almost always prevail, and the [subpoenaed] documents must be
produced”).
215 At least, that is what they are supposed to do. See id. at 301 (majority opinion) (noting that
the lower court in the case had placed the initial burden of proving reasonableness on the
government).
216 See id. at 299-301 (discussing the limits on the investigatory powers of the grand jury).

148

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 103

Nonetheless, some lower courts have avoided the seemingly inescapable
conclusion that federal subpoenas are reasonable by suggesting that a
subpoena could also be deemed unreasonable if it seriously undermined a
privacy interest and only nominally advanced a federal investigation.217 If
this test sounds familiar, it should: the same basic test is used to assess a
privilege claim under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. That does not mean,
however, that a court applying the reasonableness test under Rule 17(c)
would necessarily reach the same conclusion regarding a subpoena’s
enforceability.
Indeed, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena for THCF Medical Clinic Records,
the first case to review a grand jury subpoena of a state medical marijuana
registry, the state successfully challenged a federal subpoena under Rule
17(c)—but not under Federal Rule of Evidence 501—by claiming that
compliance with the subpoena would jeopardize its medical marijuana
program and violate registrants’ privacy interests.218 The subpoena at issue
sought registration documentation on seventeen named patients from the
state of Oregon. The grand jury was investigating the patients’ suppliers
but not the patients themselves; it sought the patients’ help in proving its
case against the suppliers. According to the court, the problem was that the
registration documentation contained private information which, by the
federal government’s own admission, would not advance the grand jury’s
investigation. Oddly enough, the government already had the names of the
patients in the registry. When the government was prompted at oral
argument to explain why it wanted the registration documentation anyway,
its only response was that it needed to update its contact information for
the patients—a task that could just as easily have been accomplished by
looking in a phone book.219
Though the THCF decision constitutes a victory for states, it is a very
limited one. The decision hinges on a not-so-universally accepted argument
that essentially transforms a losing statutory privilege claim into a winning

217 See In re Grand Jury, John Doe No. G.J.2005—2, 478 F.3d 581, 585 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“[S]ome courts have recognized that Rule 17(c) enables district courts to quash a subpoena that
intrudes gravely on significant interests outside of the scope of a recognized privilege, if
compliance is likely to entail consequences more serious than even severe inconveniences
occasioned by irrelevant or overbroad requests for records.” (citing In re Grand Jury Matters, 751
F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1984))).
218 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
219 Id. (“Normally, phone records, driver’s licenses and motor vehicle records are not confidential sources of such information. The Government has not shown why it needs to obtain all of
the addresses and phone numbers from the State of Oregon and the THCF Medical Clinic rather
than from some other source.”).
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statutory reasonableness claim—a controversial move that, if widely
adopted, could render federal privilege law largely irrelevant. The THCF
court also may have assigned too much weight to the states’ interest in
promoting participation in its medical marijuana program. After all,
Congress has found that marijuana has no medical benefits,220 so any action
that stops seriously ill people from using the drug would actually be a good
thing from the federal government’s perspective (the appropriate lens
through which to view reasonableness claims). In any event, the facts of the
THCF case are sui generis. The decision does not suggest that all (or even
any other) subpoenas of records held by states could be successfully
challenged under Rule 17(c) or under the comparable test applied to
administrative subpoenas. All that a grand jury needs to do is demonstrate
some plausible need for the information being subpoenaed. A more
carefully crafted subpoena—i.e., one seeking limited information the federal
government did not already have on hand—should satisfy the demands of
reasonableness.221 Indeed, it is telling that a federal district court in Michigan
subsequently refused to quash a nearly identical administrative subpoena of a
state’s medical marijuana registry on reasonableness (or privilege)
grounds.222

220 See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (noting
that “for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana has ‘no currently accepted medical
use’ at all” (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000))).
221 Like THCF, most cases that find a subpoena unreasonable have emphasized that the
federal government’s interest in obtaining the information was very weak. See, e.g., United States
v. Bergeson, 425 F.3d 1221, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2005) (quashing a subpoena of nonprivileged
testimony of a federal public defender on reasonableness grounds while emphasizing that the
government had other less invasive means to acquire the information); Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v.
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding a subpoena unreasonable where the federal
government sought a hospital’s abortion records for use in a suit challenging the constitutionality
of federal partial-birth abortion law, and noting that the government’s attorney “drew a blank” at
oral argument when asked what he hoped to learn from the records), aff’g Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v.
Ashcroft, 2004 WL 292079 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
Courts generally uphold subpoenas—no matter how sensitive the information sought—as
long as the government can demonstrate some need for the evidence. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 801 F.2d 1164, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding a subpoena seeking patient charts
and records in a federal drug case against a physician); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp.
2d 1111, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (upholding a subpoena seeking the names of a newspaper’s
confidential sources for a grand jury’s investigation of the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative’s
steroid distribution).
222 United States v. Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, No. 10-109, 2011 WL 2412602, at *14
(W.D. Mich. June 9, 2011).
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D. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Constitutional federalism doctrine and federal statutes, as presently
construed, provide, at best, limited protection for the states’ interest in
refusing to supply information to the federal government. As an alternative
tactic, the states could try to assert the interests of private citizens in nondisclosure to bar the federal government from using certain types of
information gathered by the states. Most promisingly, this could be done by
asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on
behalf of citizens whom the states have compelled to provide information.
This constitutional privilege limits how the federal government may use
such information and thus might ameliorate some of the harms imposed by
commandeering. However, the privilege is too limited to eliminate those
harms altogether, and there is no other constitutional right currently
recognized that prevents the federal government from exploiting what the
states know about the private lives of their citizens.
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination bars the government from using the compelled testimony of a witness in a criminal case
against that witness.223 For example, the federal government may not
compel W—say, by threatening imprisonment—to testify about his drug
distribution activity, only to use that same testimony to criminally prosecute him for drug crimes. Importantly, the federal government may not use
W’s testimony if it has been compelled by a state government.224 In other
words, as long as W’s testimony was compelled by some sovereign’s legal
process, no other domestic sovereign may use it in a criminal proceeding
against W.
The privilege thus limits the way that the federal government may exploit the information states compel their citizens to provide. First, the act of

223 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (proclaiming that no person shall be “compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself”).
224 The Supreme Court confronted a case involving just this scenario. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In Murphy, the state compelled testimony from
a witness by offering him immunity from state charges in exchange for his testimony; the witness
still refused to testify because his testimony could have incriminated him on federal charges. Id. at
53-54. He was held in contempt of court, and the Court vacated the conviction. Id. at 78.
However, the Court held that the witness should be given the chance to testify again and granted
him immunity from federal prosecution for his testimony because it had been compelled by the
state. Id. at 79. The rule was motivated by the concern that the federal government could
otherwise circumvent this privilege by asking states to compel incriminating testimony from a
witness, on promise of immunity from state charges, and then use the testimony against the
witness in a federal criminal proceeding. See Peter Westen, Self-Incrimination’s Covert Federalism, 11
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 13-14 (2006) (discussing the rationale behind Murphy).
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submitting information to state agencies and the submitted information
itself are typically testimonial in nature.225 What is more, courts have held
that reporting information is compulsory in many contexts, at least for
purposes of the self-incrimination clause.226 In many states, residents who
fail to report stand to lose important legal benefits227 or face civil sanctions.228 Hence, in those situations where reporting constitutes compelled
self-incrimination, the federal government may not use the information
citizens submit to state agencies to criminally prosecute those citizens.
Nonetheless, the privilege against self-incrimination provides at best
limited protection for the states’ interest in secrecy. For one thing, the
privilege does not stop the federal government from using compelled
testimony in any civil proceeding against a witness.229 Indeed, this explains
why the states may compel their citizens to report in the first instance—as
long as they do so only for regulatory purposes, the use of such testimony
does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.230 In other words, the federal
government may use information a state has compelled from its citizens to
help impose a variety of ostensibly civil federal sanctions upon them.231 The
list of civil sanctions the federal government could levy includes the
revocation of government benefits, such as public pension payments;232 the
termination of government employment and debarment from participation

225 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966) (“[T]he protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take . . . .”).
226 Compulsion exists anytime the government imposes a penalty for exercising the right to
remain silent. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment guarantees . . . the right of a person to remain silent . . . and to suffer no penalty . . . for such
silence.”); see also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 650 (1976) (noting that the threat of
possible future criminal prosecution constitutes compulsion for purposes of asserting privilege);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (plurality opinion) (discussing “[t]he threat of
disbarment and the loss of professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of
compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege”); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500
(1967) (holding the threat of loss of government employment unconstitutionally coercive).
227 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.090(a)(1) (2008) (requiring state registration for a defendant to assert the medical marijuana defense).
228 See supra note 31, and accompanying text.
229 See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1986) (permitting compelled testimony in
civil commitment proceeding).
230 See, e.g., Balt. City Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990) (“The
Court has on several occasions recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be
invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State’s public
purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.”).
231 The test for distinguishing between regulatory and punitive sanctions is laid out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
232 See, e.g., MacLean v. State Bd. of Ret., 733 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (Mass. 2000) (holding that
revocation of a public employee pension is civil in nature).
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in federal programs;233 the deportation of noncitizen residents;234 the
revocation of DEA registration;235 and even lengthy civil confinement;236 to
name just a few. Importantly, even though they do not implicate the Fifth
Amendment, these sanctions may deter citizens from cooperating with their
states just as much as do criminal sanctions.
A second shortcoming stems from the personal nature of the privilege
against self-incrimination: It protects the witness alone and not anyone else
who is incriminated by the witness’s testimony.237 Hence, the federal
government could use the compelled testimony of W to prosecute D. For
example, when the federal government subpoenas a state’s medical marijuana
registry, it may compel registered patients to identify their suppliers
(persons who are far more appealing targets to federal prosecutors anyway).
Indeed, many states employing a medical marijuana registry already require
patients to submit incriminating information about other persons (physicians, caregivers, and suppliers) during the application process.238 To shortcircuit patients’ Fifth Amendment objections, the federal government
would only need to grant them “use immunity”—essentially a promise not
to use their testimony against them in any future criminal case.239
Apart from the Fifth Amendment, there is no other individual right the
states could assert on behalf of citizens that would prevent the federal
government from exploiting states’ secrets. Most tellingly, the Supreme
Court has flatly rejected the notion that the Due Process clause gives
citizens a fundamental right to privacy in delicate information they might
want to keep out of the hands of the government. In Whalen v. Roe, the
Court upheld a New York statute that required physicians to report all
233 See, e.g., United States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding debarment
to be remedial in nature).
234 See, e.g., Smith v. INS, 585 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1978) (“A deportation proceeding is
civil in nature, not criminal. Thus, an alien can be required to answer questions about his status
and his right to remain in the country, as long as the answers would not subject him to criminal
liability. These responses can be used to prove deportability.”).
235 See, e.g., Hoxie v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 419 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that privilege does not apply in a hearing about revocation of prescription authority).
236 See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986) (holding that privilege does not apply
to a hearing regarding civil confinement).
237 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (“The Constitution explicitly prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness ‘against himself’; it necessarily does not proscribe
incriminating statements elicited from another.”).
238 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 475.309(2) (2007) (requiring applicants to identify, inter alia,
their physicians, designated caregivers, and sources of supply).
239 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003 (2006) (providing for use immunity). The Supreme Court
has held that use immunity satisfies the demands of the Fifth Amendment. See Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
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prescriptions for Schedule II controlled substances to a state health agency.240
State law enforcement agents used those reports to help identify and
prosecute suspected drug abusers.241 The Court recognized that patients
have an interest in keeping their most personal information from the
government and in making important medical decisions free of the fear of
embarrassing disclosures.242 Nonetheless, the Court found no constitutional
violation in the reporting scheme:
[D]isclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital
personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often
an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the health
of the community, does not automatically amount to an impermissible
invasion of privacy.243

*

*

*

In sum, the federal government may expose states’ secrets. Constitutional federalism doctrines, as presently construed, do not bar the commandeering of states’ secrets. The courts have presumed that Printz does not
apply to demands for information, either because such demands do not
compel states to assist in the enforcement of federal law or because they do
not burden state governments. There is also no federally recognized privilege
that would necessarily stop federal authorities from obtaining state records
for purposes of enforcing federal law. Courts have occasionally quashed
federal demands for state records on reasonableness grounds. But reasonableness claims are unlikely to prevail against most demands. The privilege
against self-incrimination does impose some limits on how the federal
government may use certain types of information possessed by the states,
but those limits are sparse and easily circumvented.

240
241
242
243

429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977).
Id. at 595.
Id. at 598-600.
Id. at 602 (internal citation omitted). In any event, recognizing a broad constitutional
right against disclosure would be a double-edged sword for the states: on the one hand, it might
allow them to withhold information from the federal government; on the other hand, it might also
allow citizens to withhold information from the states, as well.
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IV. RESTORING STATE AUTONOMY: A NEW APPROACH TO
SAFEGUARDING STATES’ SECRETS
This Part contains the core prescriptive claims of the Article. I suggest
that the conventional wisdom has misjudged the commandeering of states’
secrets. The courts have made a false distinction between the services
commandeered in Printz and the services commandeered by statutory
reporting requirements, administrative subpoenas, and grand jury subpoenas. Providing information about federally regulated activity is tantamount
to assisting in the administration or enforcement of federal law. Just as
importantly, compelling states to provide such information incurs the same
structural harms as compelling them to provide other services.
In a nutshell, I propose that courts treat demands for information as
constitutionally prohibited commandeering. I make the case for applying
the anti-commandeering rule and address the appropriateness of its
application to the three forms of commandeering states’ secrets. I then
address some potential exceptions and objections to my proposal. Lastly, I
briefly consider some political solutions as alternatives to my proposal.
A. What It Means to Enforce or Administer Law
As discussed above, some lower federal courts have summarily dismissed
challenges to demands for information on the ground that the Printz Court
already approved of them.244 In Printz, Justice Scalia suggested that federal
laws that “require only the provision of information to the Federal Government[] do not involve the precise issue before us here, which is the forced
participation of the States’ executive in the actual administration of a federal
program.”245 And in her concurrence, Justice O’Connor approved of
“refrain[ing] from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting
requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant
to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid.”246
The problem is that the Supreme Court has never actually held that
demands for information are constitutionally permissible. The Printz
Court’s cursory remarks do not instruct the lower courts to exempt federal
demands for information from the constitutional prohibition against
commandeering. At most, the remarks suggest that the Court may have
thought such demands could (somehow) be distinguished from the com-

244
245
246

See supra subsection III.A.2.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (emphasis added).
Id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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mands issued under the Brady Act. As a result, the Printz Court may have
thought it wise to leave the door open for the lower courts to consider the
issue more thoroughly in subsequent cases. But the lower courts never took
up that task. Instead, most of them have simply presumed that Printz
conclusively decided the matter and have upheld federal demands for
information on that basis alone.
Outside of some exceptions discussed later, Printz invalidated federal
commands that require the states to participate in the enforcement or
administration of a federal regulatory program. The scope of the anticommandeering rule thus hinges on what it means to “enforce” or “administer” federal law. Unfortunately, the Printz Court did not expressly
elaborate upon those key terms. The lower courts have simply glossed over
this important issue and presumed that providing information about
regulated activity (somehow) does not amount to participating in the
enforcement or administration of federal law.
The lower courts’ presumption appears to rest on a narrow conception
of enforce as “to compel obedience.”247 A few courts have employed this
particular conception when interpreting the term “enforce” in a handful of
congressional statutes ranging from the CSA to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).248 If accepted for purposes of the anticommandeering rule, this conception would seemingly forbid Congress only
from compelling state officials to compel their own citizens to do (or not
do) something. For example, a congressional command to a state official to
seize a medical marijuana dispensary and arrest and restrain its proprietor
would clearly constitute a command to enforce federal law—i.e., the official
would be obliged to compel the proprietor’s obedience with the federal
CSA.
It is far from clear, however, that the Supreme Court had such a narrow
conception in mind in the anti-commandeering cases. To begin, the Court
used the term “enforce” interchangeably with other terms like “adminis-

247
248

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “enforce”).
For instance, 21 U.S.C. § 885(d) (2006) grants immunity from criminal prosecution to
any state or federal official “engaged in the enforcement” of state or federal drug laws. Some
courts have interpreted “enforcement” to mean “to compel compliance with the law.” E.g., United
States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2006). Courts have arrived at similar interpretations under provisions of ERISA. See, e.g., Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th
Cir. 1987) ( “[A]n action ‘to enforce’ means an action to compel someone to do something or not
to do something, such as make contributions, that ERISA or the plan requires be done or not
done.”).
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ter”249 (as in, to administer federal law) and “execute”250 (as in, the executive functions of a state), and these terms do not necessarily have the same
restrictive definition as “enforce.” In common usage, these terms simply
mean to perform a task or duty—and surely, even running a simple search
of a state database entails performing a task or duty.
More importantly, the actual holding of Printz suggests a broader conception of the term “enforce” and of the reach of the anti-commandeering
rule. Indeed, Printz easily could be read to condemn rather than to spare
demands for information, notwithstanding the dicta noted above. The
reason, as Dean Evan Caminker has surmised, is that “the primary duty
imposed by the Brady Act itself is a ‘reporting’ requirement of sorts.”251 The
Printz Court even acknowledged that the “central obligation” imposed by
the Brady Act upon Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs) is to “‘make
a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or
possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law, including
research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and
in a national system designated by the Attorney General.’”252 In an earlier
portion of the opinion, the Court had similarly noted that CLEOs were
required only “to provide information that belongs to the State” and “to
conduct investigation in their official capacity, by examining databases and
records.”253 Importantly, the Court noted that the Brady Act “does not require
the CLEO to take any particular action if he determines that a pending transaction
would be unlawful; he may notify the firearms dealer to that effect, but is not
required to do so.”254 In other words, CLEOs were not required to compel
anyone else to do (or not do) anything, e.g., to forego a proposed firearm
transaction.
It is hard to fathom what sort of principled distinction could be drawn
between the actual duties imposed by the Brady Act and the duties imposed
by congressional reporting requirements, administrative subpoenas, and
grand jury subpoenas discussed herein. Consider, for example, the subpoena
issued by the DEA requiring a Michigan state agency to search its medical
marijuana registry and provide the DEA “copies of any and all documents,

249 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 162 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “administer” as “to
carry on, or execute (an office, affairs, etc.)”).
250 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 247 (defining “execute” as “to perform or
complete (a contract or duty)”).
251 Caminker, supra note 16, at 235.
252 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994)).
253 Id. at 932 n.17 (emphases added).
254 Id. at 903 (emphasis added).
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records, applications, payment method of any application for Medical
Marijuana Patient Cards and Medical Marijuana Caregiver [C]ards and
copies of front and back of any cards” pertaining to seven named individuals under federal investigation.255 Like the background check provisions of
the Brady Act, this subpoena required the state to search for and provide
information it had gathered in its sovereign capacity to assist federal agents
in detecting and sanctioning violations of federal law.
Further undermining the case for a narrow application of the anticommandeering rule, the Printz Court rejected the notion that informationreporting requirements could be distinguished from demands for other state
services on the basis of historical practice.256 To be sure, the federal
government has demanded information from the states more commonly
than it has demanded other services. But the federal government’s growing
penchant for commandeering states’ secrets is no reason to absolve that
practice from constitutional prohibition.257 Most statutory reporting
requirements are of distinctly modern origin. They have been adopted as
part of The Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984, The Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, The Crime Control Act of 1990,
The Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990, and The Highway Safety Act
of 1991, among others.258 Indeed, in Printz, Justice Scalia downplayed the
constitutional significance of such statutes, arguing,
Even assuming they represent assertion of the very same congressional
power challenged here, they are of such recent vintage that they are no
more probative than the statute before us of a constitutional tradition that
lends meaning to the text. Their persuasive force is far outweighed by
almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice.259

255 United States v. Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, No. 10-109, 2011 WL 2412602, at *1 (W.D.
Mich. June 9, 2011).
256 In Printz, the Court cited the dearth of congressional legislation commandeering state
executives and legislatures, particularly during the Founding era, to help justify its anticommandeering rule. 521 U.S. at 905-18. It reasoned that “if . . . earlier Congresses avoided use
of this highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to
exist.” Id. at 905.
257 The Court has not shied away from invalidating modern practices it deems constitutionally suspect merely because they have become commonplace. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 944 (1983) (holding legislative veto provisions, which appeared in nearly three-hundred
congressional statutes, unconstitutional).
258 See supra subsection I.C.1.
259 521 U.S. at 918.
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Likewise, statutes authorizing administrative agencies to subpoena records are now commonplace, but those statutes are also of relatively recent
vintage. The first notable administrative subpoena statute appeared in
1887,260 but until 1943, the administrative subpoena power was quite
narrow,261 and it is not even clear when it was first employed to obtain
records from an unwilling state.
The grand jury could pose a special exception. Grand juries have exercised broad investigative powers since well before the founding of the
nation,262 and the Fifth Amendment expressly mandates their use in most
federal criminal proceedings.263 It might be argued that the Fifth Amendment authorizes the grand jury to demand assistance—informational or
otherwise—from the states in conducting its criminal investigations. I
discuss such an exception below. For now, however, it is worth noting that
this exception to the anti-commandeering rule would only apply to demands made by federal grand juries and would not apply to demands made
by administrative agencies or Congress.
In lieu of the lower courts’ narrow conception of enforcement, I espouse
a broader vision that includes the gathering and reporting of information,
even if these tasks do not directly involve compelling a citizen to do (or not
do) anything. This conception not only seems more consistent with the
actual holding in Printz, but it also reflects a more robust understanding of
what law enforcement entails. For one thing, gathering and reporting
information—via inspections, investigations, surveillance, etc.—about
regulated activities is a quintessential task of law enforcement. To say that
law enforcement excludes these tasks is to ignore much of what law enforcement agencies actually do. Indeed, the very definition of the term “law
enforcement” is the “detection and punishment of violations of the law.”264

260
261

Hughes, supra note 22, at 587 n.37.
See id. at 587-88 (“[T]he early cases on administrative subpoenas displayed judicial reluctance to grant broad enforcement.”).
262 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 74, § 8.2(c) (discussing the view that “the early history of
the grand jury clearly establishes the legitimacy of its extensive investigative authority. The power
of the grand jury to compel testimony was recognized well before the adoption of the Constitution . . . .”); see also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280 (1919) (“At the foundation of our
Federal Government the inquisitorial function of the grand jury and the compulsion of witnesses
were recognized as incidents of the judicial power of the United States.”).
263 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”).
264 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 247, at 964 (emphasis added). Courts have
employed even broader definitions of the term. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct.
1259, 1272 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The ordinary understanding of law enforcement includes
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Under this view, law enforcement entails a series of interwoven tasks. The
gathering of information is, of course, a crucial first step in that process;
everything else, including prosecution and punishment, necessarily follows it.265
This broader conception of enforcement and of the reach of the anticommandeering rule also avoids some of the puzzling results that might
otherwise arise under the lower courts’ reasoning. For example, if the anticommandeering rule merely bars Congress from requiring state officials to
force ordinary citizens to do (or not do) something, Congress could
presumably require those officials to perform any other task that does not
require them to compel action (or inaction) from their citizens. Congress
would not be limited to demanding information from the states. For
example, it could presumably force state officials to perform other timeintensive tasks, such as clerical work, janitorial services, and so on. It seems
difficult to imagine that the Printz Court would have embraced such a
narrow rule.
B. The Structural Harms of Commandeering States’ Secrets
Not only is commandeering states’ secrets conceptually indistinguishable
from commandeering other enforcement services, but the burdens it
imposes on state officials and the damage it inflicts on their relationships
with their constituents are also the very same harms that animated the
Court’s decisions in New York and Printz. In particular, the Printz Court
warned that, “[b]y forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden
of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can
take credit for ‘solving’ problems without having to ask their constituents to
pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.”266 Likewise, the New York
Court remarked that
where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials . . . remain insulated . . . . Accountability is thus diminished when, due

not just the investigation and prosecution of offenses that have already been committed, but also
proactive steps designed to prevent criminal activity and to maintain security.”).
265 See, e.g., Fan, supra note 176, at 52-53 (discussing how one piece of state-gathered information—the criminal “rap sheet”—shapes federal law enforcement decisions about search, arrest,
prosecution, and sentencing).
266 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
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to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the
views of the local electorate . . . .267

Requiring states to provide information about regulated activity forces
them to absorb some of the financial costs of enforcing federal law that
should be borne by the federal government instead. As discussed above,
commandeering states’ secrets makes it more difficult for the states to
gather information about and from their citizens. When the threat of
commandeering looms, states need to hire more law enforcement agents or
grant deeper regulatory concessions to gather the same quantum of information.268 This added burden, properly conceived, is a cost of enforcing
federal law against private citizens, rather than a cost of bringing the state
itself into compliance with federal law.269 In the logic of Printz and New
York, the burden should be borne by the federal government.
The lower courts have plainly misjudged the harmfulness of commandeering states’ secrets. In their decisions rejecting challenges to federal
demands for information, the lower federal courts have almost uniformly
assumed that the burden of providing information is minimal or even nonexistent. In so doing, they have emphasized that the federal government is
seeking only information already on hand.270 In other words, the state need
not expend any additional resources tracking down marijuana distributors,
undocumented aliens, tax cheats, and so on, because that information is
already in its files. To comply with an order seeking information already on
hand—a tax return, a criminal record, a medical marijuana registration
form, a license application, an environmental audit, etc.—a state official
would usually need only to type a few keystrokes on a computer—a burden,
to be sure, but apparently not one of constitutional magnitude.
These courts’ myopic focus on the immediate burden of compliance
ignores the dynamic costs of commandeering discussed above. Commandeering information already on hand cannot, of course, impair the state’s
ability to gather that information; after all, citizens cannot take back
information they have already submitted to a state. But commandeering

267
268
269

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992).
See supra Part II.A.
The costs associated with bringing a state into compliance with federal laws that properly
apply to it do not raise constitutional concerns, at least under existing jurisprudence. See Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000) (“We agree with South Carolina’s assertion that the [Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act’s (DPPA)] provisions will require time and effort on the part of state
employees, but reject the State’s argument that the DPPA violates the principles laid down in
either New York or Printz.”).
270 See supra Section II.A.

2012]

Commandeering States’ Secrets

161

does burden state efforts to gather information. Citizens might refuse to
submit information in the future if they know their submissions could later
be used against them by federal authorities.271
Interestingly, the federal courts have not been oblivious to the dynamic
costs of information expropriation when those costs are borne by the federal
government. In a number of prominent cases, the federal courts have
denied state actors access to the privileged records of federal agencies, due
to concerns that the states’ use of those records would burden the federal
government.272 In Pierce County v. Guillen, for example, a plaintiff sought
access to confidential reports submitted by a county to the federal Department of Transportation (DOT).273 The reports allegedly discussed the
dangerous condition of a local roadway on which the plaintiff’s wife had
been killed in an automobile accident.274 The county submitted the report
to the DOT to qualify for federal highway safety improvement grants.275
Congress had required submission of the reports in order to help the DOT
allocate scarce federal grant funds, but it realized that the information
contained therein could also prove useful in pursuing negligence claims
against the governments providing the information.276 Hence, to encourage
reporting, Congress had designated that the reports would be privileged.277
Nonetheless, the state court hearing the plaintiff’s tort suit against the
county ordered disclosure of the report.278 The county appealed, and, in a
unanimous decision, the Guillen Court held that Congress could prevent a
state court from commandeering information submitted to a federal
agency.279 In so doing, the Court cited the federal government’s concern
that giving state courts access to the reports would deprive Congress of

271 See Richardson, supra note 85 (discussing reports that some Maine residents have refused
to sign up for the state’s medical marijuana registry due to fears that confidential registry
information could be seized by federal authorities).
272 See, e.g., Sewell Chan, The Mayor Has Nothing but Harsh Words for a Gun Bill Before Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at B5 (reporting that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives would not disclose gun trace data that New York City wanted to use in a civil
nuisance lawsuit against gun dealers and manufacturers); David Kocieniewski, I.R.S. Sits on Data
Pointing to Missing Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2010, at A1 (reporting that the IRS refused to
share federal tax return data that could have helped state law enforcement track down abducted
children).
273 537 U.S. 129, 136-37 (2003).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 136.
276 Id. at 134.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 138-40.
279 Id. at 145-46.
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useful information, in essence, because local governments would be reluctant to submit candid reports they knew could later be used against them.280
The federal government’s concern seems legitimate, and the Court’s
opinion, at least on policy grounds, appears sound.281 Unfortunately for the
states, however, if the roles of the governments had been reversed in
Guillen—that is, if a federal court or agency had sought access to a report
made to and privileged by a state government—the information would not
have been safe.
It is true that these dynamic costs are imposed only indirectly. A state
incurs them only if its residents decide to clam up and the state also decides
to invest more to restore the flow of information. The economic costs
imposed by the Brady Act were arguably more direct. The Act required the
state to process a background check anytime a resident sought to purchase a
firearm. It is not obvious, however, that the distinction, assuming it exists,
has any constitutional significance. The drain on a state’s budget is the
same. Moreover, it is not necessarily true that the budgetary impact is
somehow more avoidable in the context of secrets commandeering. A state
cannot realistically underfund agencies that gather information for vital
state programs any more than it could underfund the CLEOs who were
ordered to search state databases.282 Both moves would help the state avoid
the economic costs of enforcing federal law, but both would also seriously
undermine the enforcement of state law.
In any event, commandeering states’ secrets also imposes the second
type of cost that animated Printz—the political cost that state officials endure
when they are forced to help administer objectionable and unpopular federal
laws. No less than other forms of commandeering, the commandeering of
states’ secrets threatens to undermine the states’ roles as autonomous
sources of policymaking authority and vehicles for passive resistance to
federal law. It is a bedrock feature of our federal system that states may
pursue their own approaches to regulating the activities of private citizens,283 even when—within certain bounds—those approaches conflict with

280
281

Id. at 147.
But see Lynn A. Baker, Lochner’s Legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce County v. Guillen
as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REV. 727, 751 (2005) (criticizing the Court’s decision and arguing that
federal privileges should not bind state courts).
282 Recall that CLEOs were required to make only a “reasonable effort” to conduct searches
of databases. United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). The reasonableness of any effort
would seemingly depend on the resources that a CLEO has at her disposal—the fewer her
resources, the more reasonable it would be for her to forego a search altogether.
283 See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 928 (“It is an essential attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority. It is
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federal policy.284 In New York v. United States, for example, the Court
insisted that “even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”285 This
concept of state autonomy includes a number of features. Most importantly
for present purposes, the states may refuse to lend their assistance to federal
law enforcement.286 This laudable feature of our federalism forces “Congress to internalize the financial and political costs of its actions.”287 It
cannot shift these costs onto the states by “compel[ing] the States to enact
or administer a federal regulatory program”288—a move that would dramatically expand the federal government’s power vis-à-vis the states and their
citizens.289
The importance of protecting the states’ ability to control the use of
their own law enforcement resources cannot be overstated. Congress’s
prescriptive authority is expansive, to the point that it is difficult to imagine
issues on which Congress does not have authority to legislate.290 But
because enforcement arguably “controls the effective meaning of the law,”291
the states’ ability to refuse to enforce federal law gives them de facto control

no more compatible with this independence and autonomy that their officers be ‘dragooned’
. . . into administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the independence and
autonomy of the United States that its officers be impressed into service for the execution of state
laws.” (internal citations omitted)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“[T]he
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States
to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”).
284 See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 440
(2002) (“Collective autonomy describes . . . the freedom of the people of a state . . . to adopt
public policies that suit them even though such policies are at odds with national preferences or
the preferences of other states.”); see also Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1445-50
(discussing conditions under which state laws that conflict with federal policies are constitutionally
immune from preemption).
285 New York, 505 U.S. at 166. For a detailed discussion of how the anti-commandeering rule
protects state autonomy, see Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1445-62.
286 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”).
287 Young, supra note 13, at 16.
288 New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
289 Printz, 521 U.S. at 922 (“The power of the Federal Government would be augmented
immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police
officers of the 50 States.”).
290 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 49 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the Court’s holding “threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into federal
regulatory reach”).
291 Lemos, supra note 18, at 700.
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over a number of important policy domains that are, formally speaking,
subject to congressional regulation.292 The federal government’s capacity to
enforce laws on its own is quite constrained, in large part because of its
limited capacity to gather information about all of the activities it regulates.293 In the enforcement gaps that inevitably arise, the states can play a
meaningful governance role—one not scripted by Congress—and can foster
the benefits commonly attributed to a federal regime, such as preference
satisfaction, experimentation, and tyranny prevention, among others.
Unfortunately for the states, however, the lower courts have seriously
undermined their ability to refuse assistance and passively resist federal
authority by allowing federal agencies to conscript their informationgathering capacity. Indeed, some courts have missed entirely one of the key
points behind the anti-commandeering rule and the point of state autonomy
more generally. These courts have dismissed as illegitimate, for constitutional purposes, the notion that state officials may refuse to provide
assistance to the federal government out of mere contempt for its policies.294 As a result, state officials may be pressed into performing tasks
essential to the enforcement of federal laws they and their constituents
deem objectionable. What is more, those state officials may be blamed,
criticized, and mistrusted for doing so.295
C. The Contours of the Proposed Anti-Commandeering Rule
I propose that courts deem federal demands for state information to be
prohibited commandeering. To prevail, a state would need to demonstrate
only that it is being compelled by the federal government to provide
information.296 It could object to providing information on any grounds,
including opposition to the substance of federal law, and that objection

292 See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 17, at 1463-79 (arguing that states’ de facto
authority exceeds their de jure authority in many policy domains).
293 See supra Section I.B.
294 See supra Section III.A.
295 See supra Section II.B.
296 The demands discussed throughout the Article are plainly compulsory. State officials may
be sanctioned for defying a federal subpoena or court order. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g)
(authorizing contempt sanctions to enforce court subpoenas); DOJ REPORT, supra note 58, at 11
(“Most statutes authorizing administrative subpoena enforcement in federal district court
authorize the court to impose contempt sanctions upon a recipient who continues to refuse to
comply even after a court order of compliance.”).
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could take any form.297 Importantly, the state would not need to demonstrate any harm from commandeering, for the Printz Court made it clear
that “no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system
of dual sovereignty.”298
Interpreted to bar demands for states’ secrets, the anti-commandeering
rule would force Congress to absorb the full costs of administering federal
regulatory programs. Such a rule would give Congress the incentive to
choose the least costly method of acquiring the information needed to enforce
its own legislation299: (1) hire more federal gumshoe detectives, (2) offer more
regulatory concessions to entice private reporting to federal agencies, or (3)
purchase the information from the states (an option discussed below). The rule
would also ameliorate the accountability concerns surrounding commandeering.
State officials could refuse to help enforce unpopular federal laws, without
necessarily abandoning enforcement of local laws.300
My proposal, however, would not preclude all federal efforts to extract
information from the states. The Court has recognized several exceptions
and limitations to the anti-commandeering rule that, for present purposes, I
would apply to demands for information as well. These exceptions permit
Congress to pressure, and, in some circumstances, even compel states to
supply information to the federal government, without running afoul of the
rule. In the subsections below, I briefly discuss those exceptions, their
scope, and their implications for my analyses. I also briefly elaborate upon a
potential grand jury exception to commandeering claims, suggested above.
Lastly, I discuss, and squarely reject, a separate exception, seemingly
recognized by lower courts and advanced by some legal scholars, that would
permit commandeering of states’ secrets out of sheer necessity. As I argue,
such an exception is unnecessary and flatly inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent.

297 Most importantly, this means that a state would not need to demonstrate that the information was formally privileged by state law—a determination that seems largely irrelevant to the
constitutionality of the federal government’s demand.
298 United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
299 Cf. D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process—The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 661-62 (1985) (suggesting that
Congress would legislate more efficiently if it were required to bear the full costs of its legislative
programs).
300 For a discussion of the dilemma state regulators now face without the protection of such
a rule, see supra Section II.B.
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1. Existing Exceptions to the Anti-Commandeering Rule
a. Conditional Spending/Preemption
First, Congress may coax information from the states by offering them
conditional grants of federal funds or regulatory powers.301 So long as
Congress gives the states a constitutionally sufficient alternative to providing information, it does not run afoul of the anti-commandeering rule.302 In
the logic of the Court, “[w]here Congress encourages state regulation rather
than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local
electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.”303
Invoking its conditional spending power, Congress could give the states
the choice between accepting federal money in return for providing
information or foregoing federal money and keeping the information secret.
Indeed, Congress has employed this method to coax information from states
in a number of statutes. Consider, for example, the Solid Waste Disposal
Act Amendments of 1980.304 The Act provides that “[e]ach state
shall . . . compile, publish, and submit to the [EPA] Administrator an
inventory describing the location of each site within such State at which
hazardous waste has at any time been stored or disposed of.”305 Though this
provision contains mandatory language (“shall”), the following section
clarifies that the reporting duty applies only if a state wants federal grant
funds.306
Similarly, pursuant to its conditional preemption power, Congress could
arguably give the states the choice between not gathering information at
all,307 or sharing all information they do gather. Congress has not actually

301 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-73 (1992) (distinguishing conditional
spending and preemption from prohibited commandeering).
302 See id. at 175-76 (finding the choices offered to the states inadequate because Congress
could not constitutionally impose either of the options upon the states).
303 Id. at 168.
304 Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
305 42 U.S.C. § 6933(a) (2006).
306 Id. § 6933(c). If a state refuses to undertake the task, the Act also provides that the EPA
Administrator must step in to compile the inventory. Id. § 6933(b).
307 I say “arguably” because at least one notable jurist has expressed doubts about Congress’s
ability to impair state efforts to glean information needed to enforce state laws. See Conant v.
Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“By precluding doctors, on
pain of losing their DEA registration, from making a recommendation that would legalize the
patients’ conduct under state law, the federal policy makes it impossible for the state to exempt
the use of medical marijuana from the operation of its drug laws. In effect, the federal government
is forcing the state to keep medical marijuana illegal. But preventing the state from repealing an
existing law is no different from forcing it to pass a new one; in either case, the state is being
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employed the conditional preemption power in this way, but to illustrate
how it would work, suppose Congress threatened to preempt state laws that
compel medical marijuana dispensaries to apply for a license from the state.
This is something Congress arguably could do, although it would be
controversial and likely politically infeasible. Of course, Congress does not
really want to scuttle state information gathering—it wants the information
for itself, after all. But Congress could use the threat of preemption to
pressure the states into sharing their secrets. Indeed, the Court has upheld
equally stark proposals against constitutional challenge. In Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, for example, Congress offered the states
the unpalatable choice between abandoning regulation of power plants or
regulating them only after considering federal guidelines.308 Neither choice
was particularly appealing to the states, but since Congress could preempt
all state regulations, the former option made the choice set constitutionally
adequate.309
Programs like these should be upheld as long as the inducement is not
coercive and does not violate any other requirement imposed by the
Court.310 Among other things, Congress must clearly provide advance
notice to the states any time it seeks to extract concessions from them using
its conditional spending and preemption powers.311 In the present context,
this means that Congress must clearly lay the states’ options on the table
before the federal government demands information. The failure to do so
vitiates the conditions—in this case, the duty to provide the information.312
Importantly, most federal demands for information discussed herein
could not be characterized as conditional spending or preemption programs,
for Congress has not actually given the states constitutionally adequate
notice that they must provide information to the federal government—i.e.,

forced to regulate conduct that it prefers to leave unregulated.”), aff’g Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000
WL 1281174 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
308 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-66 (1982).
309 Id. at 764.
310 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (discussing constitutional requirements for conditional spending programs); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566, 2605 (holding that the “threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget . . . is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the
Medicaid expansion” of the Affordable Care Act).
311 See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
(“States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they are ‘unaware’ or which they are ‘unable
to ascertain.’”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (holding that “if
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously”).
312 Murphy, 548 U.S. at 296-97.
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notice that occurs before the federal demand for information actually arises. As
discussed earlier, the federal government seldom warns the states that it will
expropriate information they have not yet collected. Instead, it commonly
catches state regulators unawares, demanding information only after it has
already been collected. Indeed, the federal government has a strong
incentive to conceal the threat of commandeering from state regulators until
after they have gathered it, in order to ensure that the states continue to
gather information that serves federal law enforcement priorities. At
present, even the most sophisticated state officials have only a vague
understanding that the information they are now gathering could later be
commandeered.
The clear notice rule helps to alleviate the political accountability problems that otherwise plague commandeering. It ensures that state officials
can make regulatory decisions based on full information. State officials will
know the price that the state must pay to monitor federally regulated
activity. Constituents will know whether the information they provide to
the state is going to be forwarded to the federal government. And if state
officials nonetheless make a choice their constituents oppose—either to
collect, or not to collect, information—those officials will not be unjustifiably blamed for that choice. But because Congress has not actually disclosed
the threat of commandeering ex ante, most extant demands for state
information cannot be treated as permissible conditional preemption/
spending legislation.
b. Generally Applicable Reporting Requirements
Second, Congress may impose duties on the states that it also imposes
upon private citizens—i.e., duties that are generally applicable.313 In other
words, Congress may demand information (or other services) from the
states so long as it demands the same information (or services) from private
citizens. This exception to the anti-commandeering rule is based on the
notion that the states will have powerful political allies who can help

313 See United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (“Assuming all the mentioned factors were true, they might be relevant if we were evaluating whether the incidental application to
the States of a federal law of general applicability excessively interfered with the functioning of
state governments.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (“Most of our recent
cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment have concerned the authority of Congress to subject
state governments to generally applicable laws.”).
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forestall passage of unduly burdensome commands in the national political
process.314
Congress already subjects the states to some generally applicable reporting requirements,315 and the Court has upheld this practice. In South
Carolina v. Baker, a case decided prior to Printz, the Court upheld a federal
statute which ordered the states—alongside all bond issuers—to record the
names of bond owners and forward that information to the IRS, in order to
help it collect federal taxes on bond income.316 Similarly, in Reno v. Condon,
a decision postdating Printz, the Court upheld a federal statute that required
states—alongside other database owners—to obtain the consent of citizens
before selling their information.317 Both decisions stand for the simple
proposition that laws of general applicability do not violate the anticommandeering rule when they are applied to the states.318 In other words,
they do not create a carte blanche exception to the anti-commandeering rule
for all federal reporting requirements.
Though Congress may use this exception to circumvent the anticommandeering rule in some cases, it is important to note that the exception currently does not—and, more fundamentally, could not—justify most
of the demands for states’ secrets discussed throughout this Article. For one
thing, many of the demands currently imposed on the states have not been
made generally applicable. Nearly every statutory reporting requirement
discussed above, in subsection I.C.1, for example, is aimed exclusively at the
states; Congress does not require comparable reporting by private citizens.319

314 See Jackson, supra note 152, at 2207 (suggesting that “statutes that fall on private and
public interests may be more likely to be closely politically monitored and contested; the
legislative process is ‘safeguarded’ from imprudent decisions not only by the states’ representation
but also by the general public’s representation”). But see Adler & Kreimer, supra note 152, at 113-15
(rejecting this rationale for the exception).
315 For example, states are required to report the incomes of employees to the IRS, as are
private employers. See 26 U.S.C. § 6051(a), (d) (2006).
316 485 U.S. 505, 527 (1988).
317 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
318 See Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15 (“Such ‘commandeering’ is, however, an inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity.”); see also Condon, 528 U.S. at 151 (“But we need not address
the question whether general applicability is a constitutional requirement for federal regulation of
the States, because the DPPA is generally applicable.”).
319 Even demands that do apply to private citizens fail for a different reason: Congress has
not (yet) clearly stated its intent to apply them to the states as well. The clear statement
requirement stems from a long line of cases in which the Court has refused to apply federal
regulations to the states absent Congress’s express imprimatur thereon. See, e.g., Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (dismissing an age discrimination lawsuit brought by state
judges on the grounds that Congress had not plainly stated its intent to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act protections to the state courts). For example, the Attorney General’s
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Even more fundamentally, some demands made by the federal government could never be considered generally applicable. To illustrate, a
demand for information that a state gathers in its sovereign capacity is, by
definition, a demand for information private citizens could not possess.320
For example, Congress could not force a state to disclose the contents of its
medical marijuana registry, for that information is owned exclusively by the
state and was obtained by promising inducements—such as immunity from
prosecution—that only the state could grant.321 Similarly, the Printz Court
explained, “the suggestion that extension of [the Brady Act] to private
citizens would eliminate the constitutional problem posits the impossible.”322
The Brady Act does not merely require CLEOs to report information in
their private possession. It requires them to provide information that belongs to the State and is available to them only in their official capacity; and
to conduct investigation in their official capacity, by examining databases
and records that only state officials have access to.323

These limitations should protect many of the most sensitive states’
secrets from commandeering, even if they leave some states’ secrets
exposed.324

power to issue administrative subpoenas in controlled substances investigations, as discussed
earlier, could be considered generally applicable—it says, “any records.” But Congress did not
clearly state its intent to make that power applicable to state government records. Thus, even if
the Attorney General demanded information from a state that a private party might also possess
(e.g., an employee drug test), the subpoena might still be quashed on the grounds that it failed to
satisfy the clear statement requirement.
320 Cf. Jackson, supra note 152, at 2207 (suggesting that generally applicable statutes protect
states because the required duties are “unlikely to be aimed at uniquely governmental functions of
states”). As Professors Adler and Kreimer note, however, “the concept of ‘general applicability’ is
not pellucid.” See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 152, at 111 (discussing problems courts must
confront in determining whether a duty is generally applicable).
321 Focusing on the means used to gather data is one way, though not the only way, to identify information obtained in the states’ sovereign capacity.
322 United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 932 n.17 (1997) (emphasis added).
323 Id.
324 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius may have further limited the reach of
this exception. A slim 5–4 majority of the Court drew a sharp distinction between regulating the
activity of private citizens and compelling such activity. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012). The Court
found that Congress could not compel citizens to “do things that would be good for them or good
for society”—for example, to buy health insurance—even though “[t]hose failures—joined with
the similar failures of others—can readily have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id.
Under the Court’s reasoning, it would seem that Congress could not impose a duty on all citizens
to report violations of federal law. This would, of course, make it impossible for Congress to apply
a generally applicable reporting duty to state law enforcement agents.
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c. The Reconstruction Amendments
Third, Congress may commandeer the states pursuant to its powers
under the Reconstruction Era Amendments.325 Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, empowers Congress to “‘enforce’ by
‘appropriate legislation’ the constitutional guarantee that no State shall
deprive any person of ‘life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’
nor deny any person ‘equal protection of the laws.’”326 The basis for this
exception is straightforward: the Reconstruction Amendments changed
Congress’s relationship vis-à-vis the states, affording Congress greater
powers than it otherwise enjoys in executing its Article I authority.327
When implicated, this exception would clearly permit the federal government to demand information from the states. Indeed, the federal
government could plausibly demand any enforcement service it wanted
from the states, not just information gathering. But this exception is limited
in important ways by the Court’s narrow construction of Congress’s
enforcement powers, and thus does not pose a serious threat to most states’
secrets. In the Court’s view, Congress is “limited to enacting laws that
prevent or remedy violations of rights already recognized by the Supreme
Court. Moreover, . . . ‘[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end.’”328
This interpretation substantially narrows the universe of states’ secrets
Congress could seize pursuant to Section 5. Under Section 5, for example,
Congress could subpoena state election records for the purpose of investigating claims of civil rights violations levied against a city election commission.329 This alleviates one of the prime objections to the application of the
anti-commandeering rule to the provision of information: the notion that
the rule would insulate state officials from federal investigation into their
abuses of constitutional rights. At the same time, however, the federal

325 See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 152, at 119-26 (noting that there is a general consensus
that Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment powers are not constrained by the anticommandeering rule).
326 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5).
327 See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 152, at 126-31 (discussing the justification behind the
exception).
328 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 297
(3d ed. 2006) (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
329 See, e.g., In re Cohen, 62 F.2d 249, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1932) (upholding grand jury subpoenas,
issued against the president of the New York City Board of Elections, seeking election records for
the purpose of investigating civil rights violations).
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government could not subpoena state records to investigate violations of
federal law that do not also amount to violations of constitutional rights,
including, most importantly, violations of federal law committed by private
citizens.330
d. State Judges
Fourth, the anti-commandeering rule does not circumscribe Congress’s
power to command state judges to perform judicial functions, such as
hearing federal causes of action. The Framers envisioned that Congress
would rely extensively upon state courts, and thus, implicitly gave Congress
more authority over state courts than it has over state legislators and state
executive officials.331 Article III, for example, empowers Congress to create
the lower federal courts, but does not require it to do so.
Nonetheless, even assuming that providing information to Congress or a
federal agency is a judicial function, Congress’s unique power vis-à-vis state
judges does not pose a serious threat to states’ secrets because state judges
possess only a small fraction of the total store of information states now
gather. In other words, Congress might order state judges to turn over some
criminal records, court judgments, and similar documents in their possession.332 But it could not order them to provide the far more voluminous
records maintained by state regulatory agencies, including medical marijuana
registries, prescription drug records, business licenses, environmental audits,
tax filings, and other records not submitted to state courts.
2. New Exceptions to the Anti-Commandeering Rule
a. Grand Juries
More interestingly for present purposes, courts could craft a new exception permitting commandeering by federal grand juries. To be sure, the
harms imposed by grand jury subpoenas are essentially identical to the
harms imposed by statutory reporting requirements and administrative
subpoenas. But subpoenas issued by a federal grand jury arguably could be
treated differently. For one thing, grand jury investigations are authorized
by the Constitution itself. In other words, one might suppose that the Fifth

330 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620-24 (2000) (holding that Section 5
does not empower Congress to regulate private persons).
331 See Caminker, supra note 16, at 213-17 (discussing, but also critiquing, this exception).
332 See Fan, supra note 176, at 70 (“Congress could mandate that state courts retain, in
scanned retrievable form, prescribed judicial records made or used in adjudicating guilt.”).
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Amendment authorizes the grand jury to commandeer information—or
even other investigatory services—from states for use in its investigations.
As one prominent group of criminal procedure scholars has written, “the
early history of the grand jury clearly establishes the legitimacy of its
extensive investigative authority.”333 By contrast, neither of the other two
methods of commandeering states’ secrets is authorized directly by the
Constitution. Both statutory reporting requirements and administrative
subpoenas are creatures of congressional statute. In addition, both methods
were likely unknown to the Framers. Most accounts suggest Congress
began to impose information reporting requirements on the states in the
1980s.334 It did authorize administrative subpoenas decades earlier—still
recently, in constitutional terms—but the practice was narrowly circumscribed until at least the 1940s.335
On the basis of this textual and historical distinction, one might argue
that investigative commands issued by grand juries should not be subject to
the anti-commandeering rule, though I leave full consideration of the issue
for another day. If a court were to adopt such an exception, however, it is
essential that it also enforce long-standing restrictions on the scope of the
grand jury’s investigative powers. Perhaps most importantly, it must not
allow the grand jury to be used to pursue purely regulatory investigations.336 This limitation preserves the original role of the grand jury and
helps prevent the federal government from using the grand jury exception
to sidestep the limits I propose on its civil enforcement powers, namely,
statutory reporting requirements and administrative subpoenas.
b. Necessity
A final argument sometimes employed in support of a broad power to
commandeer states’ secrets emphasizes the federal government’s apparent
need for the information possessed by the states. Some lower courts have
emphasized this need as grounds for compelling states to provide information to federal agencies.337 In City of New York v. United States,338
discussed above, the Second Circuit explicitly resorted to such reasoning. It

333
334
335
336

LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 74, at § 8.2(c).
See supra subsection I.C.1.
See supra subsection I.C.3.
See, e.g., BRENNER & SHAW, supra note 75, at § 8.6 (discussing limits on a grand jury’s
authority to conduct civil investigations).
337 See supra Section III.A.
338 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
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suggested that the federal government could compel states to divulge their
secrets any time it needs that information to enforce federal law.339
To begin, the argument that necessity could ever justify commandeering
states’ secrets is misguided. The Supreme Court has made this clear: “No
matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply
does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.”340 In
other words, once the determination is made that compelling a state to
divulge secrets is tantamount to commanding them “to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program,” the anti-commandeering rule is
plainly violated. This per se rule spares the courts the nettlesome task of
trying to weigh the complex harms identified herein against the probabilistic benefits to federal enforcement.
In any event, commandeering states’ secrets is not really ever necessary,
because Congress can always resort to other, more appropriate means to
gather the information it needs.341 To be sure, it is currently impossible
without the help of the states for the federal government to track down and
punish many people who are violating federal law. But the fault lies with
Congress, not the states. Congress can bolster the federal government’s own
information-gathering apparatus, for example, by hiring more agents. Or it
can try to persuade the states to provide the information by offering them
grants.342 The problem with current interpretations of the anticommandeering rule is that they give Congress no incentive to do these
things. Indeed, if anything, the necessity exception would give Congress the
incentive to depend even more heavily on the states in order to make its
need for the states’ information all the more apparent. As discussed above,
forcing Congress to employ noncoercive means would help to ensure, via
the political process, that the benefits of using the information to enforce
federal law exceed the added costs of gathering it.
At bottom, states should be allowed to refuse federal demands for information that are based on no more than the federal government’s asserted
need for the information. No doubt, this will hamper the enforcement of

339 Id. at 35 (holding that the states could not forbid voluntary sharing of information
because it would allow them to “frustrate effectuation of some [federal] programs”).
340 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
341 Cf. Hills, supra note 152, at 857-58 (arguing that commandeering is generally not necessary because Congress can use its spending powers and conditional preemption to achieve its
desired ends).
342 In some cases, Congress could resort to one of the other exceptions to the anticommandeering rule as well, such as investigating claims that state officials have violated the
constitutional rights of citizens.
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some federal laws, especially against private citizens. But this is a feature of
our federal system and a necessary consequence of the anti-commandeering
rule itself. Congress must provide for the enforcement of federal laws; it
cannot shift that burden onto the states, even out of necessity.
D. The Lack of Realistic Political Alternatives
Convincing the federal courts that, as a matter of precedent, logic, history,
and constitutional structure, the Constitution empowers the states to keep
secrets from the federal government is not the only possible way to address
the problems caused by the commandeering of states’ secrets. Here, I
briefly consider the steps that Congress and the Executive branch could
take to address these problems. As I suggest, however, none of these
political strategies holds the same promise as a judicially enforced constitutional prohibition on commandeering. Therefore, it is all the more imperative to find a judicial fix.
Congress could rescue state lawmakers by creating a new statutory privilege that would shield states’ secrets from disclosure to the federal courts,
federal agencies, and even Congress.343 Congress could tailor the new
privilege to provide the same, more, or less protection than the anticommandeering rule discussed above.
Congress, however, has no obvious incentive to bail out state regulators
and to assume the costs of enforcing federal law now borne by the states.
Commandeering poses serious problems for state lawmakers, but it is
generally a boon for Congress. It augments federal law enforcement and the
effectiveness of federal regulations at no cost to the federal treasury. To be
sure, the tactic can (and does) sometimes backfire, such as when a state
abandons or foregoes monitoring of federally proscribed behavior due to
concerns about the federal government’s interest in the data.344 But
members of Congress are not likely to be blamed for any perceived deficiencies in state regulatory programs, even if those deficiencies are caused in
large part by the threat of commandeering.

343 See Raymond F. Miller, Comment, Creating Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the
Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771, 777 (1999) (“Rule 501 provides for continuing recognition
of privileges, immunities, and non-disclosure provisions by federal statute . . . . Additionally,
Congress can enact privilege-like confidentiality statutes through its general law-making powers
and in the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
344 For a discussion of how Maine recently abandoned its medical marijuana registry
requirements due, in part, to concerns that the federal government would seek to exploit the
information it was collecting, see supra note 99.
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To some extent, officials in the Executive branch could also protect
states’ secrets by simply declining to exercise their expansive subpoena
powers against the states. It stands to reason that if these officials realized
that their demands for sensitive information jeopardized federal objectives—namely, by pushing states to forego monitoring of and state-imposed
restrictions upon federally proscribed behaviors—they might refrain from
subpoenaing state records in the first instance, even if neither Congress nor
the courts stood in their way.345
Experience, however, highlights the peril of relying exclusively on agency
self-restraint to protect highly sensitive information.346 The peril lies in the
fact that internal (i.e., voluntary) guidelines do not legally bind the hands of
executive officials. Internal guidelines cannot be enforced by the courts, and
thus may be ignored or abandoned by the Executive at will.347 In any event,
even if senior executive officials remain committed to respecting states’
secrets, they cannot guarantee that every federal employee will necessarily
do the same. The DOJ employs ninety-two United States Attorneys, each
of whom operates largely independently of Washington. The DOJ leadership would have a difficult time making sure that each United States
Attorney (along with other DOJ employees) strictly obeys the letter and
spirit of the guidelines.348 In addition, hundreds of other executive branch
officials are empowered by statute and regulation to issue administrative
subpoenas.349 It seems a stretch to say that anything short of judicially
enforced restrictions could prevent all of them from commandeering states’
secrets.

345 Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) (suggesting that federal prosecutors
would refrain from subpoenaing news reporters for their confidential sources if they thought the
subpoenas would damage the news-gathering function).
346 See, e.g., RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of
Subpoenas Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 637-38, 666 (2008) (finding that the
DOJ regularly subpoenas news reporters, notwithstanding DOJ Media Guidelines ostensibly
designed to curb the practice); see also Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of
Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 640-46 (2011)
[hereinafter Mikos, New Approach] (suggesting that the federal campaign against medical
marijuana has continued largely unabated, despite a recent DOJ memorandum arguably designed
to curtail enforcement actions against individuals acting in compliance with state law).
347 See Mikos, New Approach, supra note 346, at 641 (“[E]ven assuming the [DOJ’s NonEnforcement Policy toward medical marijuana] more plainly and forcefully sought to foreclose
prosecutions, there’s arguably nothing that a federal court (or criminal defendant) could do to
enforce it against the DOJ.”).
348 See id. at 643-46 (discussing the DOJ’s inability to control federal prosecutors because of
monitoring costs, unclear state laws, and other factors).
349 See DOJ REPORT, supra note 58, at 7 (“Most administrative subpoena authorities have
been redelegated by the entity head to subordinate officials within the entity.”).
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In short, commands to provide information look the same and generate
the same problems as did the commands invalidated in Printz and New York.
Such commands force states to participate in the administration of and bear
some of the financial and political costs of federal regulatory programs. The
courts should treat demands for information as prohibited commandeering.
Congress should be able to obtain information from the states only by using
one of the recognized exceptions to the anti-commandeering rule. The case
for judicial intervention is even more apparent once we consider the lack of
obvious incentives for Congress or the executive branch to address the
problems created by the commandeering of states’ secrets.
CONCLUSION
Through a variety of measures, the states are amassing troves of information detailing the regulated activities of their citizens, including activities
that violate federal law. Not surprisingly, the federal government is keenly
interested in obtaining this information. Using statutory reporting requirements, administrative subpoenas, and grand jury subpoenas, it has commandeered states’ secrets for use in federal criminal and civil investigations.
Such commandeering imposes two costs on the states. First, by stoking
the incentives of private citizens to conceal their activity from state
regulators, commandeering makes it more difficult for the states to gather
information in the first instance. Commandeering thus adds to the already
hefty financial and privacy costs of enforcing state law. Second, commandeering forces state officials to help advance federal policies they or their
constituents deem objectionable. What is more, state officials might be
unfairly blamed for providing information to federal officials and advancing
controversial federal policies.
Despite these objections, the lower courts have uniformly upheld federal
demands for information. The courts have presumed that the anticommandeering rule does not prohibit such demands, either because
providing information about regulatory violations does not entail assisting
in the enforcement of federal law or because the benefits of information
expropriation outweigh the costs. The job of protecting state information
falls instead to a patchwork of federal statutory and constitutional privileges
for which federalism is at best a secondary consideration. This patchwork
provides only limited protection for states’ secrets and thus means that
almost any information collected by the states—information that is essential
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for the enforcement of state law and that can only be gathered by making
assurances of its confidentiality—can be exploited by federal officials.
This Article argues that the conventional wisdom is wrong: states should
be allowed to keep secrets from the federal government. It grounds that
claim in a careful reading of the Court’s anti-commandeering decisions, a
fuller recognition of the tasks that executive officials regularly perform, and
a deeper appreciation of the structural harms that demands for information
inflict. This Article suggests that federal demands for information should be
considered prohibited commandeering. In all important respects, the
commandeering of the states’ information-gathering services is indistinguishable from the commandeering of other law enforcement services. Until
the courts act to constrain this troubling practice, the states will not be able
to fulfill their roles as autonomous sources of regulatory power and vehicles
of passive resistance to federal authority.

